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1 Preface 
1.1 Introduction to the Subject Matter 
The principle of party autonomy (l’autonomie de la volonté) is one of the most celebrated features 
of contemporary international arbitration. The notion of party autonomy refers to the parties’ power 
to determine the form, structure, system and other details of the arbitration. For instance, the 
parties’ agreement to arbitrate, the subject matter of the arbitration and the method of conducting 
arbitration all are choices made by the parties and thus manifestations of the will of the parties.
1
 As 
procedural flexibility of arbitration is a perceived advantage compared to procedures in national 
courts, the principle of party autonomy has been assessed to enjoy, in comparison to national courts, 
particular significance in international commercial arbitration.
2
  
As the arbitral tribunal operates on the parties’ mandate, the arbitrators are perceived responsible 
for determining the law governing the merits of the dispute in the absence of the parties’ agreement. 
In performing this task, the arbitrators today generally enjoy broad discretion, which applies not 
only to the method they use, but also to the subject matter of their choice.
3
  
Derived from the parties’ power to make procedural decisions regarding the arbitration, the 
arbitrators’ procedural powers may be roughly divided into three major subcategories.4 These 
include: 
a) jurisdictional power, i.e. the arbitral tribunals’ power to decide upon its own competence;5  
b) choice-of-law power, i.e. the arbitral tribunals’ power to decide upon the applicable law to 
the merits of the dispute;
6
 and 
                                                 
 
1
 See Redfern – Hunter 2009, pp. 18 – 19 and Lew et al. 2003, p. 31. 
2
 See Born 2009, pp. 81 – 83. 
3
 See Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, p. 865. 
4
 While this division does cover the main aspects of the arbitrators’ powers, it is not, however, exhaustive. Common 
powers of arbitral tribunals also include the power to decide upon the language of the arbitration, document production, 
the presence of witnesses, administer oaths and to examine the subject matter of the dispute. See Redfern – Hunter 
2009, pp. 316 – 325. 
5
 The doctrine of separability (Kompetenz – Kompetenz) is an internationally established practice that has gained 
support and recognition in virtually all modern international and institutional rules of arbitration around the world. Ibid, 
pp. 346 – 348. It should be noted that China remains an exception to this rule. See Tao 2012a, pp. 95 – 96. 
6
 The law, or the relevant legal rules, governing the substantive issues in dispute are synonymously referred to in this 
study as the ‘applicable law’, the ‘governing law’, or ‘the substantive law’. See Redfern – Hunter 2009, p. 164. 
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c) the power to issue interim or conservatory measures, i.e. the arbitral tribunals’ power to 
issue orders intended to preserve evidence, to protect assets, or in some other way to 
maintain the status quo pending the outcome of the arbitration proceedings themselves.
7
 
The pronounced status of party autonomy in contemporary international arbitration owes much to 
the New York Convention, which stipulates upon the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards.
8
 The New York Convention provides only limited grounds for the refusal of a 
foreign arbitral award that, in turn, has functioned to further the principle of party autonomy in 
international arbitration.
9
 Additionally, contemporary arbitration laws of virtually all developed 
jurisdictions feature a similar permissive approach, thus allowing for the parties and their chosen 
arbitrators to exercise their discretion with no or only little limitations.
10
 
In practice, the details of the arbitration procedure are typically left to be governed by the rules of 
arbitration of the chosen arbitral institution. The parties’ power to decide upon details of the arbitral 
procedure may, however, be limited by the mandatory requirements of the law of the seat of the 
arbitration (lex arbitri).
11
 The choice of the place of arbitration strongly contributes to the choice of 
the law of the seat of arbitration, which governs the existence and the procedural aspects of the 
arbitration.
12
 This being said it is generally accepted that mandatory rules of the lex arbitri may 
typically only be used to ensure that the choice of law is bona fide and is not contrary to public 
policy, resulting in a limited scope of application.
13
  
                                                 
 
7
 Ibid, pp. 320 – 323. 
8
 As of 2013, a total of 149 countries have ratified the New York Convention. See 
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-of-contracting-states for an up-to-date list of the Contracting 
States. Last visited 19
th
 of January 2014.  
9
 The New York Convention inter alia prevents national courts from reviewing the merits of the disputes of the 
rendered arbitral award. See Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, p. 982 and Lew et al. 2003, pp. 20 – 21. 
10
 The referred development is a result of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which is a means to modernise and harmonise 
the arbitration legislation of national states. Most states in Europe, North America and parts of Asia have implemented 
either the Model Law or similar type of legislation to regulate arbitration. See Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, p. 
69; Lew et al. 2003, p. 412 and Saarikivi 2008, p. 40.  
11
 See Born 2009, p. 1748. 
12
 The concept that an arbitration is governed by the law of the place in which it is held, which is the ‘seat’ (or ‘forum’ 
or ‘locus arbitri’) of the arbitration, is well established in both theory and practice of international arbitration. See 
Redfern – Hunter 2009, pp. 179 – 183. Should the applicable rules of arbitration allow for it, it is also possible to 
choose a “foreign” procedural law as the lex arbitri. Regarding ICC and CIETAC arbitration, see infra Chapters 4.1.1 
and 4.2.1. 
13
 See Redfern – Hunter 2009, pp. 196 – 197. 
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The support of the lex arbitri may not only be needed to supplement the possible normative gaps in 
the applicable rules of arbitration but also to give the force of law to orders of the arbitral tribunal 
that reach beyond the parties themselves.
14
 Most importantly, the lex arbitri will confer the 
nationality of the award rendered by the arbitral tribunal, which plays a significant role regarding 
the enforceability of the rendered award.
15
 In arbitration proceedings operated under the arbitration 
rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), the choice of the place of arbitration 
could also contribute to the choice of location where the parties are typically, though not bound, to 
be heard, and the selection of the president/sole arbitrator.
16
  
Whereas most contemporary national arbitration laws are permissive and thus allow the parties a 
wide degree of discretion concerning how their arbitration should be organised and conducted, 
exceptions to the rule of thumb remain to exist. The People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) features a 
unique and, from the perspective of a Western jurist, peculiar arbitration regime. Chinese law not 
only provides separate categories for the treatment of the arbitral awards but also de facto imposes 
significant limits to the parties’ and their chosen arbitrators’ autonomy to decide upon the details of 
the arbitration. While China is, at least in the level of rhetorics, striving to demonstrate its capability 
and improve its reputation as an “arbitration-friendly” country,17 the arbitrators relatively limited 
powers to decide upon the arbitral process under the arbitration rules of China’s prime arbitral 
institution, the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”), 
would prima facie appear to lead to the opposite conclusion. 
1.2 Subject of Study and Study Outline 
This study systematises, compares and analyses the choice-of-law methodology
18
 applied in ICC 
and CIETAC arbitration. In other words, the study focuses on the methodology of the arbitral 
                                                 
 
14
 For instance, the assistance of national courts is typically needed when the arbitral tribunal wishes to impose interim 
measures on one of the parties or when the other party is forced to seek the enforcement of the rendered arbitral award 
on the losing party. See Redfern – Hunter 2009, pp. 439 – 464.  
15
 As the New York Convention only regulates the recognition and enforceability of foreign arbitral awards, purely 
domestic awards are not included in its scope of application. See infra fn. 70. 
16
 See Grierson – Van Hooft, pp. 112 – 118. 
17
 See Arnavas – Gaitskell 2012, p. 1 and Chi 2011, p. 260. 
18
 Saarikivi distinguishes the difference between notions ‘rule’ and ‘method’ as follows: whereas referring to a conflict 
rule means a reference to a certain provision that provides the arbitral tribunal with direct and simple rule to determine 
the substantive law, a method is something more abstract; it provides the means or the framework to determine the 
substantive law instead of a mechanical approach. See Saarikivi 2008, pp. 58 – 59. Based on this distinction, the notion 
‘choice-of-law methodology’ used in this study refers to the reasoning of the arbitral tribunal to determine of the 
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tribunal to determine the law applicable to the merits of the dispute in the absence of the parties’ 
instructions under the arbitration rules of the ICC and CIETAC. Notwithstanding the two 
institutions’ substantial significance in contemporary international commercial arbitration, ICC- and 
CIETAC-administered arbitrations feature distinctly different approaches in this regard, resulting in 
a vastly different scope of choice-of-law power provided for the chosen arbitral tribunal. As 
contemporary international arbitration is perceived as an autonomous and delocalised method of 
dispute resolution, the natural inclination is to ask why and how is this possible.  
The study begins by discussing the development of the theory of private international law applied in 
international commercial arbitration. Most arbitration scholars, practitioners and parties to 
arbitration today favour a delocalised approach to international commercial arbitration. As critics of 
the delocalised approach have aptly noted, arbitrations do not, however, operate in vacuums but the 
territories of national states. Although the harmonisation work with regard to international 
commercial arbitration has managed to ‘delocalise’ such proceedings significantly, exceptions may 
continue to exist. China’s national law on arbitration does not allow separate choice-of-law rules for 
arbitration but instead directs the arbitral tribunal to apply the private international law of the PRC. 
Such a choice-of-law methodology reflects the traditional approach of private international law. In 
other words, the study will indicate that the CIETAC’s incapability to modernise its choice-of-law 
rules is ultimately a result of the restrictive Chinese arbitration law.
19
  
Nevertheless, why has the Chinese Communist Party decided to abstain from the revision of the 
choice-of-law methodology applied in CIETAC arbitration? After the end of Maoist rule, the CCP’s 
incentive to build a judicial system has probably related to the Weberian-North thesis regarding the 
necessity of law for sustainable economic development. Therefore, the Party’s failure to reform the 
CAL has possibly to do with its efforts to seal its political legitimacy amongst the Chinese citizens 
and, alas, reluctance to give up its control on the Chinese society. In correspondence, the study 
discusses China’s ongoing transition to a society governed by a rule of law and its implications to 
CIETAC arbitration.
20
  
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
substantive law as a whole, beginning from the mandate of the arbitral tribunal to choose the choice-of-law rules 
applied to the merits of the dispute.  
19
 See infra Chapter 2. 
20
 See infra Chapter 3. 
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Furthermore, the study provides a systematisation and functionalist comparison of the choice-of-law 
rules applied in both ICC and CIETAC arbitration.
21
 Premised on the said comparison, the study 
attempts to analyse the rationality between the choice between the said institutions as an effective 
and fair method of commercial dispute resolution. The analysis is executed primarily from the 
perspective of private international law and the principle of party autonomy as a criterion of 
assessment. In addition, the analysis discusses the significance of the substantive law with regard to 
the outcome of a dispute, whether effective remedies to enhance the arbitrators’ choice-of-law 
power in CIETAC arbitration exist, and pinpoints the most important legal risks that relate to the 
application of a “wrong” law in Sino-foreign dispute resolution.22 The author has considered such 
discussions necessary so that a more thorough and objective analysis of the subject matter of the 
study may be provided.
23
 Finally, the results of the study are summarised.
24
 
Issues of private international law thus are the focal point of interest of this study. Most China-
specific academic literature and commentaries regarding arbitration seem to focus on the inadequate 
enforcement of arbitral awards in People’s Republic of China.25 This tendency has apparently left 
the scrutiny of choice-of-law issues related to Sino-foreign dispute resolution for only little 
attention. The point of view of this study will be that of a party counsel pondering whether it is 
preferable to opt for either ICC or CIETAC arbitration as a method of dispute resolution in an 
agreement featuring Sino-foreign parties. 
Albeit other internationally renowned arbitral institutions of significant importance
26
 and specific 
mandates
27
 do exist, this study only discusses the choice-of-law methodology applied under the 
                                                 
 
21
 See infra Chapter 4. 
22
 See infra Chapter 5. 
23
 See infra Chapter 1.3. 
24
 See infra Chapter 6. 
25
 See Cohen 2006, p. 32. In addition to the scholarly writing regarding the enforcement of arbitral awards in China, the 
issues related to the validity and form of an arbitration agreement and the arbitrability of a dispute have received a lot of 
attention. See, for instance, Tao 2012a, pp. 177 – 194. WunschARB offers arguably the most extensive database of 
translated Chinese court decision summaries on arbitration. The summaries published to date have focused on the 
enforcement of arbitral awards, validity of arbitration clauses and annulment of arbitral awards. See Taylor 2013, p. 1. 
26
 For instance, the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), the London Court of International Arbitration 
(”LCIA”), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (“SCC”), the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (“HKIAC”) 
and the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) represent some of the other more famous arbitration 
centres. See Lew et al. 2003, pp. 38 – 39. Of these institutions, at least the SCC, SIAC and HKIAC have been 
frequently used as forums for Sino-foreign arbitration. See Zimmerman 2010, p. 24 and Håkansson 1999, pp. 52 – 53. 
At least the Beijing Arbitration Commission (“BAC”) deserves a remark from the other more prominent Chinese 
arbitration commissions. See BAC Official Website, http://www.bjac.org.cn/en/. 
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arbitration rules of the ICC and the CIETAC. There are several reasons to this approach. Firstly, the 
ICC Rules may rightly be assumed to represent the latest trends in international arbitration.
28
 
Secondly, despite the effect of the confidential nature of arbitral proceedings, the amount of 
available information of institutional arbitration in comparison to ad hoc arbitration is far greater.
29
 
Thirdly, ad hoc arbitration inside mainland China is de facto forbidden due to the restrictive 
national arbitration law of the PRC.
30 
Fourthly, the ICC and CIETAC Rules have been recently 
revised, both of them having their latest amendments made in 2012. Last, but not least, the 
seemingly ever-growing importance of Chinese businesses in international commerce makes an 
inquiry to the arbitration rules of some of the most popular Sino-foreign out-of-court dispute 
resolution mechanisms both a fascinating and hot topic.
31
 
Partially owing to the same limitations, the researcher has been forced to outline the subject matter 
of this study to only to cover the implications arising from the scope of choice-of-law power 
conferred to the arbitral tribunal premised upon submitting to either ICC or CIETAC arbitration. 
This means the systematisation made in this research is conducted under the presumption the parties 
wishing to arbitrate have in their underlying contract included a valid arbitration clause that 
respectively refers to either ICC or CIETAC arbitration without an express or tacit choice regarding 
the substantive law.
32
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
27
 The China Maritime Arbitration Commission (“CMAC”) also handles foreign-related arbitration cases, although it 
has a much more limited mandate than the CIETAC as it only deals with maritime-related disputes. See CMAC Official 
Website, http://www.cmac-sh.org/en/home.asp. Legal investment disputes may be submitted to the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) provided that the contracting parties, i.e. an investor and a state, are 
situated in different countries that both are members to the Washington Convention. See Lew et al. 2003, p. 40 and 
ICSID Official Website. https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp. Both maritime and legal investment disputes fall 
out of the scope of this research. 
28
 See infra Chapter 5.2.  
29
 See Born 2009, pp. 2250 – 2253 and Lew et al. 2003, p. 283. Saarikivi suggests that the lack of published arbitral 
awards is, with the exception of ICC awards, the most problematic issue with regard to research on arbitration. See 
Saarikivi 2008, p. 38. 
30
 Article 16 of the CAL requires that an arbitration agreement must contain a chosen “arbitration commission”. See 
Zesch 2012, p. 286. Although ad hoc arbitration in China is thus legally impossible, ad hoc arbitration awards rendered 
in foreign countries can still be sought recognition and enforcement in China through the New York Convention. See 
Tao 2012b, pp. 812 – 813. Gu suggests that the denial of ad hoc arbitration in the PRC is a result of the institutional 
adherence rooted in the Chinese society. See Gu 2013, pp. 88 – 89 and Gu 2008, p. 125. 
31
 In the words of Chen, business executives tend to claim that “in terms of business you are either in China or you are 
nowhere”. Although an exaggeration, such a remark aptly illustrates China’s increasing importance in the world’s 
economy. See Chen 2008, p. 621. 
32
 In the absence of an express choice of law, the arbitral tribunal will usually look first for the law that the parties are 
presumed to have intended to choose. This is called a tacit or implied choice of law. As virtually no modern arbitration 
statute contains requirements as to the form of the parties’ consent, there is nothing to prevent the arbitrators from 
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Because of the rigid relationship between the CIETAC Rules and the Chinese Arbitration Law 
(“CAL”), the inclusion of introductory subchapters regarding the determination of the place of 
arbitration and the scope of provided party autonomy in both ICC and CIETAC arbitration have 
been considered as appropriate.
33
 The Chinese ‘dual-track’ system of arbitration and China’s multi-
jurisdictionality forces to make additional distinctions; this study will only elaborate disputes 
arising from ‘foreign-related’ or ‘foreign’ contracts in the sense meant by Chinese law and only 
concern the application of the CIETAC Rules in CIETAC venues located in mainland China.
34
  
1.3 Methodology and Sources 
As this study describes the arbitrators’ technique of reasoning to determine the substantive law in 
ICC and CIETAC arbitration, the methodological approach of the study would prima facie appear 
to be a straightforward systematisation and, to a lesser extent, interpretation regarding the normative 
content of the arbitration rules applied in ICC and CIETAC arbitration. Despite contemporary 
international arbitration is consensually perceived as an independent branch of law,
35
 CIETAC-
administered arbitrations by default apply the choice-of-law rules of the law of the seat of the 
arbitration, i.e. PRC law.
36
 This observation complicates the undertaking to a completely new level. 
Chinese law is, in essence, of a foreign origin to the author of this study; its eccentric normative 
hierarchy, a legal language with semantic meanings of its own and China’s transitional phase to a 
society governed by rule of law are, to name a few, such characteristics that continue to cause angst 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
inferring from the conduct of the parties that there is an implied agreement as to the applicable law where, for example, 
the parties argue their case on the basis of the same law, even though they have not expressly agreed to apply it. Should 
there be any doubt regarding the intention of the parties, the arbitral tribunal may not infer the substantive law. See 
Redfern – Hunter 2009, p. 230, Lew et al. 2003, p. 411; Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, pp. 786 – 787 and Lando 
1991, pp. 134 – 136. 
33
 Because the lex arbitri strongly influences the determination of the substantive law under the CIETAC Rules, without 
the explication of this framework the comparison between the choice-of-law methodology featured in ICC and CIETAC 
arbitration would be incomplete. As in the case of the substantive law, these subchapters are also conducted with the 
more common presumption that the parties have not made an explicit choice regarding the place of arbitration. See infra 
Chapters 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 and Várady – Barceló – von Mehren 1999, p. 631. 
34
 See infra Chapter 1.4.1. Chinese law does not allow for purely domestic, i.e. Chinese, parties to choose a foreign law 
to govern a contract between them. See Liang 2012, p. 80. 
35
 In Trakman’s words, this consensus can be referred to as the “legal tradition of international commercial arbitration”. 
He does not, however, claim that differences regarding between arbitral institutions around the world would not exist. 
Instead, whereas ICC arbitration is characterised by a reliance on written testimonies, CIETAC arbitration features a 
stronger emphasis on oral proceedings and conciliation. See Trakman 2006, pp. 18 – 23.  
36
 See infra Chapter 2.2. 
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for foreign legal scholars and practitioners interested in conducting an inquiry to the normative 
content of Chinese law to date.
37
 
The description regarding the application of the Chinese choice-of-law rules could thus be 
described, in essence, as an idealistic one. The author suggests that the conclusions regarding the 
application of the Chinese choice-of-law rules should be treated with a certain level of 
cautiousness.
38
 This observation should not, however, pose an obstacle to conduct research into 
CIETAC arbitration in the first place. The objective of this study is to analyse whether submitting to 
either ICC or CIETAC arbitration is rational from the perspective of private international law.  
Should such an undertaking succeed even to the limited sphere attempted in this study, the 
description is attempted to conduct in a manner that acknowledges the present uncertainties of the 
Chinese legal system as well as possible, mostly drawing from the experiences of foreign legal 
scholars with similar ambitions.
39
 
The source material of this study consists of literature, commentaries and case summaries prepared 
by some of the most renowned scholars and practitioners accustomed to both ICC and CIETAC 
arbitration. In addition, statistics, surveys and charts are provided in order to achieve a more 
qualified systematisation of the ICC and CIETAC choice-of-law rules. Generally speaking, the 
requirement of confidentiality
40
 set for the arbitration proceedings limits the possibility to conduct 
any case studies concerning arbitral practice. Whereas an abundance of recent case summaries and 
descriptions regarding arbitral awards rendered in ICC arbitration is available, relevant arbitral 
awards issued by the CIETAC are relatively hard to come by.  In consequence, the author has been 
forced to resort to second-hand case summaries of CIETAC awards, resulting in a somewhat 
anecdotal level of scrutiny.
41
 The same is true concerning the availability of statistical data. As an 
                                                 
 
37
 See Seppänen 2005a, pp. 3 – 12 and 16 and Peerenboom 2002, p. 21. For a more thorough analysis of China’s legal 
system and its implications to CIETAC arbitration, see infra Chapter 3.2. 
38
 See infra Chapter 4.2.3. 
39
 Clarke has pointed out that a research describing Chinese law in the same manner as, for instance, French law would 
be guilty of “naive ignorance”. See Clarke 2003, pp. 93 and also Seppänen 2005a, pp. 16 – 17. 
40
 Contrary to proceedings occurring in courts of law, the requirement of confidentiality refers to the parties’ desire to 
keep the content, outcome and even the existence of the dispute in secrecy ultra partes in order to, for example, avoid 
damages to the commercial reputation of the parties. See Cordero-Moss 1999, pp. 150 – 151. 
41
 The CIETAC awards cited in this study consist of translated case summaries published by Unilex and Pace Law 
School. Consequently, they are primarily related to the application of the CISG. See http://www.unilex.info; 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/. Kluwer Law International does currently publish a non-extensive list of Chinese court 
decision summaries related to arbitration; most of the relevant decisions concern the enforcement of arbitral awards 
rendered by the CIETAC. Available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/CommonUI/chinese-case-summaries.aspx. 
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often-cited researcher of Chinese law has aptly summarised, conducting empirical studies is often 
hard and, in the case of China, “extremely difficult”.42 As an attempt to address the existing issues 
with China’s judicial transparency, the Supreme People’s Court of the PRC has recently begun to 
publish Chinese court decisions on its website.
43
 To date, these publications are non-comprehensive 
and only available in Chinese.
44
 
Another challenge is evidently posed by language issues, again, concerning Chinese law. The direct 
references of this study to Chinese laws or other notions are referred to in Mandarin using the 
phonetic pinyin spelling-technique. The researcher has mostly resorted to the use of qualified 
translations regarding Chinese laws, regulations and arbitral practice in order to ensure that the 
semantic meanings of the source material used are as close to the official and hence prevailing 
Chinese versions as possible. However, it goes without saying that such an approach does have its 
drawbacks, as it further impedes the author of conducting proper interpretative work with regard to 
the normative content of the Chinese choice-of-law rules. 
Finally, the Chinese rules of private international law seem to currently be in a state of flux. The 
method applied under the Chinese choice-of-law rules, premised upon the closest connection test, 
has been strongly relying on the application of presumptory rules. Several Chinese commentators 
have referred to a judicial document called the ‘Rules of the Supreme People’s Court on the 
Relevant Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Hearing Foreign-Related Contractual 
Dispute Cases in Civil and Commercial Matters’ (“SPC Interpretation 2007”) as the source of these 
presumptory rules to date.
45
 After the introduction of the new Chinese conflicts statute, the ‘Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on Foreign-related Civil Relationships’ (“LAL”) in 2010, the 
normative status of SPC Interpretation 2007 document has been under controversy and, as of April 
2013, formally abolished. As the newer “Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
Last visited November 26
th
 of 2013. Albeit Westlaw International does have a database of CIETAC awards, the 
majority of the available awards date back to the 1990s and thus represent somewhat outdated arbitral practice. See 
http://international.westlaw.com. Even Chinalawinfo.com, the most popular legal database in China, publishes only 
translations of arbitration-related laws, rules and regulations. See http://www.chinalawinfo.com and Luo 2006, pp. 186 
– 187. 
42
 Even if the Chinese authorities would publish such data, the validity of such data could be considered dubious. See 
Peerenboom 2001, p. 7.  
43
 See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/28/c_132926458.htm. Last visited 13
th 
of January 2014. 
44
 See http://www.court.gov.cn/zgcpwsw/.  
45
 Despite its ambiguity as a source of law already before its formal abolishment, the SPC Interpretation 2007 has been 
referred to in virtually all earlier studies of Chinese private international law because of the lack of other detailed 
choice-of-law rules. See Tu 2011, p. 687. 
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Issues Concerning Application of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Choice of Law for 
Foreign-Related Civil Relationships” (“SPC Interpretation 2013”) does not contain any 
presumptory rules, this development calls for a number of questions. Where to search for 
presumptory rules in the absence of a valid source of law? Does this development signify a change 
in the Chinese rules of private international law, which have been earlier so strongly characterised 
by the pervasive application of presumptory conflict rules? 
Most of the problems related to the research and interpretation of foreign law or, in a broader 
perspective, a legal system, relate to the fact that the subject matter of study is essentially foreign. 
Ascertaining the content of foreign law is and always will remain challenging, irrespective of 
whether it is the law of a geographically and culturally distant country or the law of a neighbouring 
country. In the case of Chinese law, a foreign researcher should always remember that the 
indigenous Chinese legal tradition, influenced by references to socialism, Confucianism and the 
transitional stage of the legal system, all remain to facilitate both the formation and interpretation of 
Chinese law.
46
 Correspondingly, the interpretative remarks of this study have been attempted to be 
conducted with appropriate prudence.
47
 
The author has chosen to continue to illustrate the Chinese choice-of-law rules premised on the 
presumptory rules featured in the SPC Interpretation 2007. This is a conscious choice. First of all, it 
is fairly hard to properly present the Chinese choice-of-law rules without a reference to the 
existence of presumptory rules so pervasively characterised in prior practice of Chinese private 
international law. Secondly, a fair amount of real arguments supports a perception that the SPC is 
about to introduce another judicial interpretation that is likely to more or less reinstate the conflict 
rules featured in the now-abolished SPC Interpretation 2007.
48
 This observation functions as the 
justification to systematise the Chinese choice-of-law rules on a now-abolished source of law. On 
the other hand, such an approach also means that the interpretative remarks made concerning the 
application of the choice-of-law rules applied in CIETAC arbitration should count, for now, nothing 
more than an enlightened guess.  
                                                 
 
46
 See Ruskola 2012, pp. 275 – 276; Peerenboom et al. 2010, pp. 38 – 39 and Jänterä–Jareborg 2004, pp. 193 – 194. 
47
 In Clarke’s view, Western lawyers who at first encounter Chinese law with a reaction anything else than perplexity 
are likely to have ineptly grasped the basics about China’s legal system. Such remarks justify approaches that consider 
only a prudent and limited interpretation of Chinese law to be possible from a foreign perspective. See Clarke 2003, p. 
93.  
48
 See infra Chapter 4.2.3. 
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As the study features a comparison of two different sets of arbitration rules, it would seem self-
explanatory that a method of comparative law is required. Because the contemporary ICC and 
CIETAC arbitrations operate in the same framework of international arbitration practice, national 
arbitration laws and, most importantly, the same clientele mostly comprehending of large and often 
multinational businesses, conventional wisdom has guided the author to use a functionalist 
approach as a method of comparison. Arguably the most renowned advocates of functionalism, 
Zweigert and Kötz, argue the basic methodological principle of all comparative law to be 
functionality. In their view, as the legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems, 
societies tend to solve these problems by quite different means though often with very similar 
results.
49
 So when the comparatist attempts to compare, for instance, two different legal systems 
with each other and research how the same problem is resolved in these societies, the unconscious 
implication is to try to find the functional equivalents from the respective legal systems and search 
for the similarities and differences appearing in the two systems. As Örücü has aptly phrased it, the 
functionalist inquires how a certain legal problem encountered both in society A and B is resolved 
by their respective (legal or other) systems.
50
  
Albeit functionalism remains to be the dominant paradigm of comparative law,
51
 a critique of 
functionalist approaches has emerged in contemporary jurisprudence.
 
Functionalist approaches, 
which identify criteria of comparison in terms not of rules but of problems, tasks, or societal needs 
met by law, are often held by cultural comparatists as deficient. According to Cotterrell, the 
deficiency of functionalism results from its failure to recognise the purposes and tasks of law are 
inevitably defined using the terms of reference provided by particular cultures.
52
 For instance, the 
taxonomic project of law, i.e. the division to legal families embraced by Zweigert and Kötz, has 
devoted most of its work to laws originating from Europe, with the corresponding marginalisation 
of the other laws of the world.
53
 Glenn argues that this results from the inherent Eurocentric bias of 
the legal family concept in favour of Western concepts of law and, in particular, the notion of the 
                                                 
 
49
 See Zweigert – Kötz 1998, p. 34. 
50
 See Örücü 2004, p. 25. 
51
 Platsas goes as far as to question whether a different kind of approach is even needed in comparative law studies. See 
Platsas 2008, p. 3. 
52
 See Cotterrell 2006, pp. 710 – 711. 
53
 While Zweigert and Kötz have the described the European legal systems in a total of 212 pages, the Islamic, Hindu, 
Chinese and Japanese legal systems have, in balance, only a description of 36 pages. In addition, Zweigert and Kötz 
dedicate the rest of their book to the notions of contract, unjustified enrichment and tort – which all three concepts are 
of European origin. See Zweigert and Kötz 1998. 
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legal system.
54
 In the case of European legal systems, whereas Zweigert and Kötz consider one of 
the rationales for the use of functionalism to be the unification of law and demonstrate this, among 
other things, with the harmonisation work done in the European Union,
55
 Legrand argues that 
simple legislative harmonisation on the surface level does not yet mean that the European legal 
systems would actually be converging.
56
 
Teemu Ruskola has conducted his China-specific comparative research based on the functionalist 
critique. Whereas he does admit functionalism to be useful to a certain extent, he does conclude that 
it has a lot of limits. As inter alia Cotterrell, Glenn and Legrand have pointed out, these limits are 
typically related to the implicit functionalist assumptions about the problems that should be 
resolved by legal rather than some other means. In Ruskola’s view, functionalism can in its worst 
lead to a kind of epistemological imperialism, in which we, i.e. Western lawyers, find in foreign 
legal cultures confirmation of the projected universality of our own legal categories, or, “proof” of 
the fact that other legal cultures lack some aspect or other of our law.
57
 Ruskola concludes that the 
conception regarding the development of Chinese law is in essence a Western representation; as the 
legislative reforms concluded in China are based on Western ideas and methodology of law, they 
may, in the end, tell more about ourselves than they do of any equivalent (or even non-equivalent) 
phenomenon in China.
58
 The post-1978 development of the Chinese legal system could have been, 
in Ruskola’s words, ‘self-Orientalisation’ more than anything else.59 Acknowledging this, Zhu Suli, 
a leading Chinese scholar, has suggested that modelling China solely by on the standards and 
interests of the West would be an unfavourable course of action.
60
 
In light of the critique presented towards the functionalist method of comparative law, the author 
believes it would be too simplistic to dismiss the choice-of-law methodology applied in CIETAC 
arbitration as ‘backwards’. Neither a dismissal of CIETAC arbitration as simply inadequate would 
provide any (new) knowledge regarding the possible advantages of using it as a method of Sino-
foreign dispute resolution. Consequently, the author believes that it is much more fruitful to attempt 
                                                 
 
54
 See Glenn 2006, pp. 434 – 435. 
55
 See Zweigert – Kötz 1998, pp. 24 – 28. 
56
 See Legrand 1996, pp. 54 – 64. 
57
 See Ruskola 2002, pp. 189 – 191.  
58
 Ibid, pp. 192 – 196. 
59
 Ibid, pp. 197 – 199.  
60
 See Peerenboom et al. 2010, p. 65. 
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to conduct the functionalist comparison in a self-conscious way, i.e. being aware of the inherent 
shortcomings and bias of the ‘classical’ functionalist method of comparative law. 
Seppänen aptly notes that the applied research method and phrasing of research questions often 
determines the result of the study even before it has started.
61
 Indeed, the functionalist comparison 
conducted in this study will, perhaps unsurprisingly, illustrate that whereas the ICC Rules leave a 
great deal of discretion regarding the arbitration procedure for the chosen arbitrators, the CIETAC 
Rules and Chinese arbitration law de facto impose heavy limitations on the arbitrators’ discretion to 
decide upon the arbitration process.
62
 As a result, the arbitrators’ power to independently choose the 
law applicable to the merits of the dispute in the absence of the agreement of the parties is limited to 
exceptional circumstances.
63
  
One could argue that the contemporary framework of international arbitral practice is apparently 
biased towards the preference of a delocalised or autonomous approach.  The current embracement 
of the principle of party autonomy in international arbitration practice, for instance, is ultimately a 
result of the wishes and needs of the international business community.
64
 In correspondence, the 
clientele-biased approach  means that the established international arbitration practice, i.e. the terms 
of reference to evaluate the success or failure of arbitration rules, has been tailored to fit the needs 
of the international businesses – not the ones of, for instance, the Chinese Communist Party. This is 
not an argument in favour or against the emergence of a pro-autonomous regime of international 
arbitration. It simply reminds that the contemporary bias of international arbitration practice 
towards delocalised arbitration inevitably results in difficulties for (Western) legal scholars and 
practitioners to appreciate some of the solutions featured in Chinese arbitration.  
In summary, the author believes that an analysis that would deem CIETAC arbitration as 
categorically lacking in comparison to ICC arbitration is an unsatisfactory one. The author would 
probably not have created any such knowledge that a prudent reader of this study would not already 
possess or at least have a clue about (which is, after all, the express objective of this study). 
Therefore, besides including a systematisation and contextual comparison of the subject matter of 
                                                 
 
61
 See Seppänen 2005a, pp. 29 – 32. 
62
 Perhaps an even more accurate way of phrasing this would be to assess that Chinese arbitration law does not confer 
CIETAC-administered arbitrations with the same powers as its counterparts in other national states. See infra Chapter 2. 
63
 See infra Chapter 4.2.3. 
64
 See Lew et al. 2003, p. 81. 
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study, the analysis will attempt to envisage such situations where the principle of party autonomy 
plays little or no role, or could be potentially remedied. By doing so, the research can also plausibly 
conclude that such situations do, at least in theory, exist where CIETAC arbitration may provide a 
rational alternative for ICC arbitration. As a result, an analysis of both added scientific and practical 
value is pursued. 
1.4 Terminology 
1.4.1 The meaning of ‘international’ 
Generally speaking, the term ‘international’ is used to demarcate arbitrations that are purely 
national or domestic and those that in some way transcend national boundaries.
65
 As some 
ambiguity exists regarding the interpretation of the term ‘international’ in the context of 
international commercial arbitration, a brief review regarding the possible semantic meanings of the 
notion is appropriate.
66
 Firstly, the French method of classifying a dispute as ‘international’ relates 
to the character of the disputed transaction, i.e. if the underlying transaction has a foreign element, 
for example involves the import or export of certain goods, the dispute may be classified as 
international even in the event of both parties to the transaction are French citizens.
67
 Other 
jurisdictions may, however, consider arbitration not be international if the parties to the dispute are 
both domiciled or habitually resident in that country, irrespective of the fact that there might be 
other contacts with foreign countries.
68
 Finally, some jurisdictions may combine the subjective and 
objective criteria referred to and thus consider arbitration as international if either one of the parties 
resides or is domiciled abroad, or if the disputed transaction has an international character in that it 
is to be performed, to a significant extent, abroad.
69
 Because different jurisdictions may have their 
                                                 
 
65
 See Redfern – Hunter 2009, p. 7. 
66
 As the concept of international commercial arbitration generally refers to an out-of court resolution of disputes 
regarding transactions containing elements from two or more countries, Cordero-Moss points out that the semantic 
meaning of the word “international” has more to do in relation to the dispute than the arbitral process itself. See 
Cordero-Moss 1999, p. 43. 
67
 See NCPC Art. 1492. 
68
 See, for example, Swiss PILA Art. 176(1). 
69
 The UNCITRAL Model Law takes this approach and further adds that arbitration may be qualified as international 
simply on the basis of the parties’ explicit authorisation. See ML Art. 1(3). 
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own tests for determining whether an arbitration award is ‘domestic’ or, in the language of the New 
York Convention, ‘foreign’, this ambiguity may cause problems.70  
Chinese arbitration law adopts a unique method to determine whether a dispute is considered 
international or not. China’s law on arbitration has traditionally adopted a dual regime for foreign-
related and domestic arbitration, with foreign-related arbitration institutions exercising jurisdiction 
over disputes involving foreign-related elements and domestic arbitration dealing exclusively with 
disputes arising between Chinese entities.
71
  
Albeit the jurisdiction of foreign-related arbitration institutions, such as the CIETAC, has been later 
extended to cover also domestic disputes and vice versa, the Chinese classification of disputes (and 
consequently, the nationality of the rendered awards) to ‘foreign’, ‘foreign-related’ and ‘domestic’ 
remains.
72
 According to a recent interpretation issued by the Supreme People’s Court, a dispute may 
be classified as foreign-related if: 
(1) either party or both parties are foreign citizens, foreign legal persons or other 
foreign organisations, or stateless persons;  
(2) the habitual residence of either party or both parties is located outside the territory 
of the People’s Republic of China;  
(3)  the subject matter is outside the territory of the People’s Republic of China;  
(4)  legal facts that establish, alter or terminate the civil relation occurred outside the 
territory of the People’s Republic of China exist; or 
                                                 
 
70
 According to Art. I(1) of the New York Convention, ‘foreign awards’ are defined as awards which are made in the 
territory of a State other than the State in which recognition and enforcement is sought; but it adds to this definition, 
awards that are ‘not considered as domestic awards’ by the enforcement State. In consequence, an award that one State 
considers to be ‘domestic’ (because it involves parties who are nationals of that State) might well be considered by the 
enforcement State as not being domestic (because it involves the interests of international trade). See Redfern – Hunter 
2009, pp. 10 – 11. 
71
 See CAL Chapters II and VII respectively regarding the distinct requirements set for both domestic and foreign 
arbitration commissions. 
72
 See Gu 2013, pp. 91 – 92 and Chi 2009, pp. 545 – 546. 
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(5) other circumstances that may be determined as foreign-related civil relations 
exist.
73
  
The classification of the dispute as either international or domestic has under Chinese law, inter 
alia, a direct effect on the scope of the parties’ autonomy and the enforcement of the rendered 
award.  For instance, the parties are allowed to choose a foreign law as the substantive law only in 
foreign-related arbitration.
74
 In addition, the dual-track policy favours foreign-related arbitration in 
comparison to arbitration procedures involving domestic parties as it subjects domestic awards to 
both substantial and procedural review in the enforcement stage.
75
 Based on the New York 
Convention, Chinese courts may subject only the procedural aspects of foreign-related awards for 
review.
76
 On the other hand, both the procedural and substantive issues of domestic awards may be 
reviewed again by Chinese courts.
77
  
Chi and Gu have suggested that the Chinese approach both seriously harms the efficiency of 
arbitration and meaninglessly wastes limited judicial resources of the Chinese courts, as the 
substantial review of domestic arbitral awards constitutes a de facto appeal or retrial of the case.
78
 
As a result of the discriminatory Chinese arbitration regime towards domestic parties, there have 
been instances in which purely Chinese parties have attempted to artificially include foreign 
elements in their agreements in order to avoid the application of mandatory provisions or 
regulations of Chinese law or, alternatively, to choose the place of arbitration overseas.
79
 
Nonetheless, the content of the most recent SPC judicial interpretation regarding Chinese rules of 
private international law would not seem to indicate any changes to existing practice, which forbids 
such measures.
80
 Correspondingly, the Chinese method of classifying of disputes should be, for the 
purposes of this study, thoroughly understood. 
                                                 
 
73
 See Art. 1 of the SPC Interpretation 2013. 
74
 See CCL Art. 145. 
75
 See Chi 2009, pp. 545 – 547. Chi suggests that foreign-related awards are deemed “quasi-Convention-awards” under 
Chinese arbitration law. Ibid. Concerns related to the weaker expertise of Chinese local arbitration commissions have 
been suggested to be the rationale of the dual-track system. See Gu 2013, p. 87. 
76
 See CPL Art. 269 and New York Convention, Art. V and Gu 2013, pp. 116 – 117. 
77
 See CPL Art. 217(2) and (3). 
78
 See Chi 2011, pp. 280 – 281; Chi 2009, pp. 553 – 554; Gu 2013, pp. 130 – 131 and Gu 2008, p. 133. 
79
 See Chi 2009, p. 547. 
80
 According to Article 11 of the SPC Interpretation 2013, artificially created connecting factors that are meant to avoid 
the application of mandatory provisions of law or administrative regulations of the PRC, will not produce any validity 
regarding the application of any foreign law. 
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1.4.2 The meaning of ‘commercial’ 
The term ‘commercial’ is generally understood as a reference to transactions carried out by business 
entities in the course of their daily business. None of the major arbitration treaties, such as the 
Geneva Protocol or New York Convention, attempted to formally define the notion ‘commercial’. 
However, they did assume that ‘commercial matters’ could be arbitrated, while other matters may 
not. This was, however, was left to each Contracting State to regulate.
81
 Even the drafters of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law left it to any Contracting State to decide for themselves what is meant by 
‘commercial’.82 The only guidance of international origin regarding the interpretation of the notion 
may be found from the travaux preparatoires of the Model Law.
83
 According to them, the notion 
‘commercial’ should be given a wide interpretation so it would cover matters arising from all 
relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not.
84
 While the referred footnote does 
also include a non-exhaustive list of transactions that are to be considered of a commercial nature, it 
seems advisable to rather exclude certain areas of law that certainly do not fall within this category 
than to attempt to make a positive definition of what is commercial.
85
   
                                                 
 
81
 The text of the New York Convention allows for Contracting States to declare that it will only apply the Convention 
to matters considered commercial under its national legislation. This clause is referred to as the commercial reservation.  
See New York Convention, Art. I (3) and Redfern – Hunter 2009, pp. 12 – 13. 
82
 Ibid. 
83
 At least to a certain extent, national courts have been explicitly authorised to use the preworks of the Model Law as a 
source of interpretation. See Holtzmann – Neuhaus 1989. Some common law countries, however, have been noted to 
disallow references to travaux preparatoires of the ML. See Craig – Park – Paulsson, p. 520, fn. 4.   
84
 See UNCITRAL ML, Article 1(1), fn. 2. 
85
 See Cordero-Moss 1999, p. 45. 
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2 The Choice-of-Law Methodology Applied in International Arbitration 
2.1 Jurisdictional and Delocalisational Theory 
The choice-of-law methodology applied in international arbitration has undergone through major 
development during the past few decades. Today, the more ‘modern’ international arbitration 
institutions perceive arbitration as a completely independent and anational method of dispute 
resolution functioning outside the jurisdiction of national courts and legislation. In order to 
maximise party autonomy and procedural flexibility, contemporary arbitration scholars have 
stressed one of the key factors regarding to the acceptability of a contemporary procedure of 
international arbitration to be whether the arbitration respects the principle of party autonomy in an 
adequate manner. In order to achieve this objective, contemporary theory of international arbitration 
has correspondingly ‘delocalised’, meaning that the parties and their chosen arbitral tribunal are, at 
least in theory, allowed to exercise full control over the determination of the substantive law.
86
  
Disputes submitted to international arbitration were once, however, perceived to be on the same 
level as domestic ones. Such a point of view, often referred to as the jurisdictional theory of 
international arbitration, was common in the first half of the nineteenth century and still affirmed in 
the Resolution of 1957 made by the XIVth Commission of the Institute of International Law, named 
“Arbitration in Private International Law”.87 Also known as the traditional approach of private 
international law, the jurisdictional theory refers to the full correspondence between the law of the 
arbitral venue and the law governing the arbitral proceedings.
88
  
Under the approach embraced under the traditional doctrine, the arbitral tribunal applies the private 
international law of the lex loci arbitri to identify both the law governing the capacity of the parties 
to arbitrate and the substantive law governing the merits of the dispute.
89
 In addition, the arbitral 
tribunal also applies the lex loci arbitri to the procedural aspects of arbitration
90
 and to the validity 
of the arbitration clause.
91
 Traditional methodology is typically applied by national courts, which 
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are bound to apply the choice-of-law rules provided by the law of the state in which the court is 
situated (lex fori).
92
 
Most arbitration scholars, however, consider the application of the jurisdictional theory in 
proceedings of international arbitration as inadequate and outdated.
93
 Much of the attraction of the 
traditional approach has relied upon its ability to provide the arbitrator with a lex fori. Contrary to 
litigation, arbitral tribunals do not, however, have a lex fori in the same sense as national courts 
do.
94
 This observation has also functioned as the main argument for the gradual abandonment of the 
jurisdictional theory regarding disputes submitted to international arbitration.
95
   
The efforts to delocalise arbitration have, however, met resistance from national states that have 
proven to be reluctant to waive their judicial jurisdiction in favour of private justice. As a result of 
this reluctance, even the most widely accepted and celebrated transnational instruments governing 
contemporary international commercial arbitration, such as the New York Convention, are 
compromise solutions rather than perfect legal documents.
96
 Indeed, the more progressive 
instruments concerning international arbitration have been noted to be rather regional than 
worldwide efforts to date.
97
 
With regard to private international law, the introduction of the European Convention was the first 
step towards delocalisation. Signed in Geneva on 21
st
 of April 1961 and aimed at promoting trade 
between the Cold War blocs, the European Convention was first regional convention to feature 
independent choice-of-law rules for arbitration.
98
 Although the practical significance of the 
European Convention has been noted to be far from that of, for instance, the New York Convention, 
the referred Article VII had a considerable impact upon later arbitration rules and texts.
99
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The turning point regarding the acceptance of the delocalisational theory in international arbitration 
has arguably been the work of the XVIIIth Commission of the Institute of International Law, which 
officially questioned the appropriateness of the application of the jurisdictional theory in 
international arbitration. After a lengthy consideration, the XVIIIth Commission decided in its Final 
Report to deny the subjectivity of international arbitration to any national law and thus affirmed the 
detachment of arbitration from national law.
100
 In fact, the General Reporter even opined that the 
only source of the arbitrators’ jurisdiction should be the will of the parties even in situations when 
the parties’ expressions would be contrary to the mandatory rules of a national law closely 
connected with the arbitral process.
101
  
This being said, the delocalisational theory met strong criticism from several scholars who 
participated in the preparation of the Resolution of 1989. For instance, a member of the XVIIIth 
Commission succinctly remarked that “arbitrations do not take place in a vacuum but instead, they 
do take place in territories of national states”, which may limit the parties’ autonomy by the means 
of restrictive law on arbitration.
102
 Arguably in consequence of the appropriate critique, the Final 
Draft of the Resolution of 1989 was approved with a vote of only a slight majority.
103
 The debate 
between the supporters of the jurisdictional and delocalisational theory has continued ever since, 
and has been described to have arisen even to “religious” proportions.104  
In correspondence with the acceptance of the delocalised approach advocated in the Resolution of 
1989, more ‘modern’ choice-of-law rules, such as the direct method, have emerged and gradually 
gained acceptance in the arbitration rules of the major international arbitration institutes
105
 and, to a 
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lesser extent, national arbitration statutes.
106
 In the context of contemporary international 
arbitration, the approaches used to determine the law applicable to the merits of the dispute are thus 
today commonly referred to as the indirect method (voie indirecte) and the direct method (voie 
directe).
107
 On the one hand, the indirect method directs the arbitral tribunal to use a conflict of laws 
analysis to determine the applicable law, for instance, by imposing upon the arbitral tribunal the 
duty to apply the conflict of laws rules that it deems applicable or appropriate. On the other hand, 
the direct method guides the arbitral tribunal to directly apply the law it deems appropriate without 
the need to refer to any conflict rules.
108
 In comparison to approaches requiring a conflict of laws 
analysis, the benefits of the direct approach are seemingly obvious: it allows for the arbitral tribunal 
to focus on the determination of the most appropriate law instead of having to focus on an often-
complicated choice-of-law analysis.
109
 Indeed, the success of the voie directe has been argued to be 
connected with the endavours to develop a transnational commercial legal order with arbitration as 
its supranational method of dispute resolution.
110
 Some of the more radical ideas envisioned under 
the delocalisational theory, such as the idea about a universal lex arbitri, remain to be an 
oxymoron.
111
 
Although time has taken its toll regarding the acceptance of the jurisdictional theory amongst 
international arbitration scholars, the apt critique presented towards the delocalised approach 
remains to be of practical value to date. Albeit the bulk of all arbitrations are today conducted 
without any reference to the law that governs the proceedings, it does not mean that the lex arbitri 
would not exist. Indeed, arbitration rules are only binding by virtue of the intentions of the parties; 
the restatement of the principle of autonomy in the arbitration rules amounts to no more than an 
affirmation by the parties themselves of their own autonomy. In the end, it is only national law that 
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can provide the basis for party autonomy and determine the conditions and limits within which it 
can be exercised. That law will be either that of the lex arbitri or the laws of all the jurisdictions 
willing to recognise an award that has given effect to the parties’ choice of applicable law.112 With 
regard to national legislators which have implemented the Model Law (or a similar arbitration 
statute), it is the established interpretation of Article 28 of the ML, which ultimately unties the 
arbitrators from the choice-of-law rules of the forum country unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties.
113
 
It would not be false to state that both of the described methods of reasoning regarding the 
determination of the applicable law, i.e. choice-of-law methodology based on the jurisdictional and 
delocalisational theory, continue to enjoy the support of international arbitration practice – at least 
to a certain extent. It would also be true to state that the application of both the choice-of-law 
methodologies can per se lead to a fair result. As a preference for an autonomous procedure of 
international arbitration has emerged, a choice-of-law methodology, which stresses the importance 
of the parties’ and their chosen arbitrators’ discretion and the actual result achieved in the 
determination of the substantive law, would indisputably seem to reflect the desired state of affairs 
much better.
114
  
2.2 Different Choice-of-Law Methodology – Different Agenda? 
As illustrated infra in Chapter 4, ICC and CIETAC arbitrations continue to apply different choice-
of-law methodology to date despite they both operate in the same context of contemporary 
international commercial arbitration. Should the CIETAC modernise its choice-of-law rules, it is 
plausible that foreign parties would perceive it as a more favourable venue for proceedings of 
international arbitration.
115
 Therefore, the question arises: why has the choice-of-law methodology 
applied in CIETAC arbitration not been revised, although it admittedly tries to make its arbitration 
to match international standards? Perhaps the most intuitive starting point for most people would be 
to guess that whereas the ICC is a non-governmental organisation that has always been advocating 
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for the promotion of international trade and investment, the CIETAC operates under the auspices of 
the People’s Republic of China, a single-party authoritarian state based on socialist ideology. In 
other words, the likely explanation for the existing discrepancies of two institutions would be very 
different historical and socio-political background. However, accusing the CIETAC for many of its 
current defects would be barking up the wrong tree. 
To begin with, the International Chamber of Commerce was founded in 1919 by businessmen from 
various countries that had been involved in the First World War.  Its establishment was based on the 
idea that increasing trade between nations would contribute to world peace.
116 
 Contrary to at least 
the most if not all other arbitration institutes, the ICC International Court of Arbitration, located in 
Paris, France, does not itself settle disputes but instead functions as an administrative body. In this 
capacity, it inter alia supervises the arbitrations’ compliance to the ICC Rules during the 
proceedings.
117
 The arbitrations conducted via the ICC operate through its representatives from all 
over the world.
118
 Because of its unique structure, the ICC has been noted to have the least national 
character compared to any of the other leading arbitral institutions.
119
 
The ICC represents the voice of the international business community.
120
 Throughout its existence, 
the ICC has actively contributed to the development of the conventions
121
 applied in contemporary 
international arbitration – albeit with mixed success.122 In correspondence with its agenda on 
delocalisation,
123
 the ICC was amongst the first arbitration institutions to implement solutions that 
reflect the delocalised approach in its arbitration rules. For instance, the exclusion of a reference to 
a lex fori was confirmed the 1975 revision of the ICC’s arbitration rules.124 As to the determination 
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of the substantive law, the direct approach was first featured in the 1998 revision of the ICC 
Rules.
125
 
On the other hand, the foundation of the CIETAC
126
 dates back to China’s ‘short golden period’ of 
legislative development of the 1950s.
127
 It was originally founded by the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade (“CCPIT”)  in 1956 to facilitate trade, in particular, between 
China and the Soviet Union.
128
 However, the ‘arbitration’ conducted in the predecessors of the 
CIETAC was not arbitration in the sense as understood with the contemporary notion of 
international arbitration.  For instance, the (domestic) arbitral awards rendered were not binding 
upon the parties, and the arbitral procedure was severely lacking in terms of judicial independence 
and party autonomy.
129
 In practice, there was little use for foreign-related Chinese arbitration before 
the end of the Cold War.
130
 
In correspondence with a market economy’s needs to have means for the protection of property 
rights, the impetus for the development of foreign-related arbitration in China is rigidly related to 
the adoption of the policy of opening up and economic reform.
131
 From 1988 onwards, the legal 
status of the CCPIT was amended from a government institution to a non-governmental 
organisation. In addition, the CCPIT began to simultaneously use the name China Chamber of 
International Commerce (“CCOIC”).132 This marks the beginning of China’s arbitration reforms 
towards international standards. China’s accession to the New York Convention in 1987133 and the 
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adoption of the first version of the Chinese Arbitration Law in 1994
134
 have been considered 
important steps in this development. As a result, the popularity of the CIETAC as a forum for 
settling international commercial disputes has risen correspondingly.
135
 Since its inception, the 
CIETAC’s arbitration rules have been amended seven times in total,136 the latest revision being the 
one elaborated in this study.
137
  
The CCOIC generally functions as a chamber of commerce in the same way as its counterparts 
overseas. Formally, it is charged with the responsibility for the organisation and establishment of 
foreign-related arbitration commissions (i.e. CIETAC and CMAC) in accordance with the Chinese 
Arbitration Law, and the formulation of arbitration rules for China’s foreign-related arbitration 
commissions.
138
 According to Tao, an admittedly close relationship between CCOIC and CIETAC 
does exist. In his opinion, it would be incorrect to claim that the CIETAC is controlled by CCOIC.  
Instead, the CIETAC functions independently in handling arbitration disputes and is free from the 
interference of any organisation or individual – as required by Article 8 of the CAL.139 
The contemporary agendas of the ICC and CCOIC thus appear to resemble with each other. As 
China remains to be a single-party authoritarian state, any comments that emphasise the 
independence of Chinese arbitral institutions probably have a dubious sound for a Westerner.
140
 To 
sum up, may CIETAC arbitration be trusted insofar as it can provide a fair and effective means of 
international commercial dispute resolution? Although CIETAC-administered arbitrators admittedly 
have some issues with transparency and the choice of arbitrators, it does not mean that it would not 
offer satisfactory arbitration services. In the author’s opinion, the CIETAC should not be blamed 
for, inter alia, the low choice-of-law power of CIETAC arbitral tribunals.
141
  
In fact, the absence of independent choice-of-rules in CIETAC arbitration is ultimately due to the 
restrictive Chinese lex arbitri. This is because CIETAC arbitration centres are, with the exception of 
the new Hong Kong venue, located in mainland China. As a result, the lex arbitri of CIETAC 
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arbitrations will, in practice, be the law of the PRC.
142
 Now, while the UNCITRAL Model Law has 
influenced the CAL, the CCP has decided not to implement the Model Law nor modernise the 
Chinese Arbitration Law after its inception.
143
 Moreover, neither the CAL nor the Chinese Civil 
Procedure Law offer any unequivocal guidance for CIETAC arbitrators regarding the determination 
of the substantive law.
144
  
Again, it has been traditionally understood that whenever national arbitration law does not confer 
the arbitral tribunal the power to apply the choice-of-law rules it deems applicable, the choice-of-
law rules of the seat country are to be applied. Therefore, the fact that the Chinese Party-state has 
not revised its national arbitration law – regardless of what the CIETAC or CCOIC wish for – is the 
ultimate reason to the current default application of the Chinese choice-of-law rules in CIETAC 
arbitration. In other words, the CIETAC Rules may not provide separate choice-of-law rules for 
arbitration before Chinese arbitration law allows for this.
145
 
Prior to the acceptance of the delocalisational theory, the application of the choice-of-law rules of 
the forum country in international arbitration was not unique at all. Several countries, such as the 
United Kingdom, have not traditionally had separate choice-of-law rules for arbitration.
146
 Today, 
the traditional approach is applied only in countries in where arbitration institutions retain a close 
connection with the state.
147
 Indeed, the analysis of this study indicates that China is a prime 
example of such a country.  
Although vowing to continue its economic and legal reforms, the Chinese Communist Party is 
arguably reluctant to make any comprehensive reforms to the Chinese arbitration regime. Should 
the Chinese government be truly committed to ensure that the CIETAC is an effective and 
satisfactory means for the resolution of international commercial disputes in comparison to the 
other arbitral institutions, it would make sense for the CCP to allow for the modernisation of the 
CAL. Subsequently, a full-range reformation of the Chinese arbitration law could function to 
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improve the reputation of the CIETAC from a foreigners’ perspective. Due to the said contradiction, 
a thorough discussion regarding China’s transition to a country ruled by law and its implications to 
CIETAC arbitration would seem necessary before it may be appropriately compared to ICC 
arbitration.  
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3 China’s Transition and the CIETAC 
3.1 Historical Perspective 
3.1.1 The Imperial, Republican and Maoist Era 
Many still tend to question whether law has ever had anything to do with the Chinese society.
148
 In 
fact, a thesis about China’s lawlessness is not new at all. Western jurisprudence has questioned the 
very existence of law in China for hundreds of years, beginning from the works of Baron de 
Montesquieu, Karl Marx, Max Weber and Georg Wilhelm Hegel. Under these ‘Orientalist’ views, 
China has been considered a fictitious adversary of the European countries.
149
 This perception is 
based on the observation that China has traditionally lacked a European-style comprehensive 
formal–rational system of law with the exception of criminal law codifications (fǎ).150 Formal law 
in China has thus traditionally not been associated at all with what Western jurisprudence 
understands with the notion of private or civil law. Instead, the Chinese society has traditionally 
chosen to rather control private property and contractual relationships by the rule of morality and 
virtue (lí), a notion typically associated with Confucianism.
151
 
After the humiliating loss of the Chinese Empire in the Opium War to the Western colonial powers 
led by Great Britain, the Qing Dynasty decided to reform of its governing system based on Western 
models. By 1911, the first comprehensive Chinese civil codifications modelled on Japanese, French 
and German civil codes had been introduced.
152
 After the Chinese uprising, the new Republican 
government re-promulgated these codifications without significant changes and continued the legal 
reform based on the heritage of the Qing Dynasty.  
The reforms of the Imperial and Republican era, however, never managed to gain a proper foothold 
in the Chinese society due to the shortage of legally educated people, various civil wars and the 
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Sino-Japanese War.
153
 Nevertheless, these reforms have contributed the development of the post-
totalitarian
154
 Chinese legal system, as it absorbs elements from the statute-based civil law legal 
systems applied in Continental Europe.
155
 In fact, the notion ‘party-state’, used by the CCP today, 
has been noted to be inheritance from the earlier regimes in power.
156
  
After the end of the Second World War, China descended into a civil war between the Communists 
and the Republicans. The Chinese Soviet Republic, led by the Chinese Communist Party and the 
charismatic Mao Zedong, gradually emerged as the reigning authority in mainland China. 
Subsequently, the People’s Republic of China was formally founded in 1st of October 1949.157 At 
first, the Communist regime seemed to be committed to establish a socialist legal system based on 
the Soviet model during the period between 1954 and 1957.
158
 This development was derailed by 
the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s, which led to the 
persecution of Chinese intellectuals who expressed dissenting opinions from the views of the CCP 
and, in particular, Mao Zedong.
159
 All further legislative development was abruptly brought to a 
halt after the beginning of the Culture Revolution in 1966, during which Mao and his followers 
smashed the existing Chinese legal institutions into complete submission.  As the case was with 
Imperial China, the totalitarian Chinese Party-state considered laws nothing else but tools of the 
state and the ruler; there were no effective legal limits on state power.
160
 This ‘rule by man’, 
contrary to a ‘rule of law’, unquestionably and rightly served to strengthen the existing Western 
prejudices about the insignificance of law in the Chinese society.
161
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3.1.2 The Post-Totalitarian Era 
After Mao’s death in 1976, China started to depart from the extreme-leftist ideology and policies as 
the pragmatist and reformist elites of the CCP gradually defeated the followers of the Maoist line 
and were restored to power. The new policy of opening up and economic reform (gaige kaifang), 
advocated by Deng Xiaoping in particular, refers to the series of economic reforms carried out in 
the PRC after 1978. In its earliest stage, it involved the decollectivisation of agriculture, the opening 
up of the country to foreign investment, and permission for entrepreneurs to start privately owned 
businesses.
162
  
Although this study cannot fully elaborate the historical development of the post-totalitarian era, the 
embracement of the policy of opening up and reform deserves a remark as it represents a turning 
point in China’s socio-economic development. After 1978, China’s leaders have continued to 
gradually transform the Chinese society from a central-planned economy to a ‘socialist market 
economy’, albeit not without setbacks.163 These setbacks are primarily related to the internal power 
struggles of the Chinese Communist Party and series of civil unrest, most important (and tragic) 
being the Tian’anmen Incident of 1989.164  
Indeed, China’s economic development tops the CCP’s agenda to date. Even recently, the 
representatives of the most important organ of China’s state apparatus, the Central Committee of 
the CCP, vowed to further deepen the policy of economic reform and opening up in its Third 
Plenary Session of its 18
th
 CCP Central Committee Meeting held in November 2013.
165
 
The agenda of economic reform also served as the CCP’s incentive to promote the restitution of a 
legal system.
166
 To cut a long story short, the disastrous effects of Mao’s campaigns ensured that 
China’s legal system has essentially been built from a complete scratch.167 Taking this starting point 
into account, the legal reform conducted in the People’s Republic of China has undisputedly 
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produced a remarkable outpouring of legislation and administrative rules in a relatively short period 
of time.
168
 The development of the PRC Constitution of 1982, amended three times to date, reflects 
the gradual transformation of the Chinese society from a centrally planned economy toward a more 
market-oriented economy.
169
 Contrary to the earlier PRC constitutions, the Constitutions’ latest 
amendment now also endorses the basic principles of a government of laws, the supremacy of the 
law, and the equality of all before the law.
170
 An abundance of new laws and various types of 
regulations has been enacted, legal institutions and education has been re-established, and the legal 
consciousness of the common layman has been improved.
171
 This being said, as a result of the 
conflicting provisions of the Chinese constitutions as well as actual political practice, rule of law in 
China has, however, been traditionally fulfilled in relation to only individual cases at best.
172
 As this 
remains to be the case to date, China’s legal system has been aptly described to be in a period of 
“transition”.173  
3.2 Rule of Law in Contemporary China 
3.2.1 Is China’s Legal Reform Trapped in Transition? 
The CCP’s incentive to build a legal system is arguably originally related to the Weberian-North 
thesis regarding the necessity of law for sustainable economic development.
174
 In other words, 
China’s ruling elite has probably not viewed the development of the Chinese legal system as an 
absolute value per se but rather as means to promote China’s economic development – arguably in 
order to seal its own political legitimacy amongst Chinese citizens.
175
 
Albeit the sincerity of the CCP’s motives to develop a legal system may thus be questioned, 
Chinese commentators claim that viewing the CCP as a hindrance to the development of China’s 
legal system is an overly simplistic and erroneous purview.
176
 In fact, the pragmatic approach of the 
Chinese government towards its reforms – both economic and legal – has been praised for even by 
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Nobel-prize winning economists. Indeed, the Chinese efforts to develop its own variant of socialist 
rule of law compatible with its current form of government and contingent circumstances might, in 
retrospect, prove to be a better alternative than the wholesale import of the liberal democratic form 
of rule of law found in Euro-America.
177
  
The CCP’s reforms remain subject to two sharply differing views presented by both its critics and 
supporters.
178
 But what should be thought out of China’s legal system – can it and the CIETAC be 
trusted? The close relationship between China’s ruling elite, judicial system and Chinese arbitration 
institutes constitutes for a discussion regarding the effects of China’s ongoing legal reform to 
Chinese arbitration. After all, it would be redundant to contemplate upon the scope of the discretion 
of the Chinese arbitrators to, for instance, make decisions regarding the substantive law, if the 
arbitration procedure itself is either partial or arbitrary.
179
 
Generally speaking, it is evident that China is still far from a country that respects the rule of law as 
understood in the West. In fact, it may very well be that it under the leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party, China will neither achieve nor want to achieve that.
180
 After all, it has been 
argued that the CCP values its control over Chinese society more than it does legal reform.
181 
Should the CCP decide to abstain from giving up its control over the Chinese judiciary, it is likely 
that China cannot, in the long run, realise her full economic and political potential.
182
 
This being said, one should not deduce that China has made no progress towards a society governed 
by a rule of law. Professor Randall Peerenboom, one of the most prestigious researchers of Chinese 
law, has aptly noted that whenever Western commentators claim that China lacks rule of law, they 
mean that China lacks the “thick” Liberal Democratic form found primarily in modern Western 
states with a well-developed market economy.
183
 Thick conceptions add to the formal aspects of a 
rule of law the elements of political morality, forms of government or conceptions of human 
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rights.
184
 In Peerenboom’s view, China’s reference to a ‘socialist rule of law’, endorsed by the CCP, 
is rather an attempt to follow a “thin” version of rule of law, utilising only the instrumental aspects 
of the thick theory. A thin version of rule of law thus imposes at minimum some meaningful 
restraints on state actors.
185
 However, the CCP’s purview regarding what kind of a variant of a thin 
rule of law should be embraced remains unclear, although it evidently rejects the Liberal 
Democratic one.
186
 
China has achieved a lot as a result of the said reforms. Pursuant to the legal reform, the CCP exerts 
much less control upon Chinese citizens in comparison to the Maoist Party-state. Moreover, a 
consensus exists regarding the increased significance of law in China and its commercial players, in 
particular.
187
 This being said, pervasive shortcomings to the proper application of even a thin 
version of rule of law in China continue to exist. The said shortcomings are systematic and 
institutional in nature, typically associated with the paternalistic tradition of the Chinese society, 
fragmentation of authority between the central and local governments, large differences in regional 
implementation of laws and corruption.
188
 As Chapter 4.2.3 vividly illustrates, ambiguity exists also 
regarding the proper interpretation and normative force of Chinese law. In fact, the problems related 
to the lack of transparency in Chinese law and regulation-making and their inconsistent 
implementation are amongst the primary complaints of foreign investors instead of, for example, 
the enforcement of contractual rights.
189
 
For the purposes of this study, the issues related to the poor enforcement of arbitral awards call for 
further elaboration. Generally speaking, foreign parties tend to opt for arbitration instead of Chinese 
courts as they perceive arbitration as a method to avoid the ambiguities or biases of China’s legal 
system.
190
 Another perceived advantage of arbitration in comparison to judgments rendered from 
national courts is the higher degree of enforcement of arbitral awards because of the limited review 
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possibilities of a foreign arbitral award under New York Convention.
191
 However, the enforcement 
of arbitral awards in China has been traditionally portrayed as difficult.
192
  
In most cases, it can be assumed that losing party will voluntarily comply with the decision of the 
arbitral tribunal.
193
 Should the Chinese party whom the enforcement is being sought against obstruct 
the enforcement of the arbitral award, the dispute is placed back in the hands of the Chinese 
judiciary. This is due to the PRC courts’ responsibility to enforce their own judgments and arbitral 
awards as well.
194
 Hence, even a clause stipulating on overseas arbitration cannot categorically 
guarantee that Chinese courts could be avoided in a dispute featuring Sino-foreign parties.
195
 
However, Chinese courts may only review the procedural aspects of foreign arbitral awards in line 
with international practice and Article V(2) of the New York Convention.
196
 
The correct instance to seek for the enforcement of an arbitral award in China is the appropriate 
Intermediate People’s Court where the defendant is located or has assets.197 There are several 
factors affecting the quality of the Chinese judiciary, such as the level of the court, the region, the 
type of case, and the division within the court.
198
 A look into China’s twentieth-century history 
reveals that the Chinese judiciary has traditionally been subordinated either to the Emperor, the 
National People’s Congress, or party officials.199 In consequence, Chinese judges have perceived 
themselves rather as civil servants than independent professionals, and have often left the 
articulation of dissenting opinions and interpretations to legal scholars.
200
 Political corruption or, in 
other words, undue interference from party officials, may not be only the only source of influence 
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on courts; individual parties, the media, civil society and others may also exert direct or indirect 
influence on the courts.
201
 
Instead of political corruption, the non-enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is seemingly more 
often linked with local protectionism. Local protectionism refers to the close economic or other 
inter-personal linkages between the Chinese judiciary and the Chinese party involved. The 
existence of such connections, or “guanxi”, has been deemed of particular importance in Asian 
countries such as China; knowing the “right people” is often perceived to help litigators or lawyers 
to make things go more smoothly.
202
 Guanxi in itself should not, however, be mixed up with corrupt 
practices. Guanxi is generally perceived to be legal, while corruption is not; it more often involves 
longer-term relationships than corrupt ones, and “builds on trust” rather than on a “commodity” 
exchange between money and power.
203
 Needless to say, the difference between duly and unduly 
influence is a blurred one, and as significant economic interests are often involved in commercial 
disputes, it should come as no surprise that parties may attempt to use their connections to influence 
judges.
204
 What seems less discussed is that not only foreign investors have to go along with local 
corruption, but that they may engage in illegal conduct themselves as well.
205
 
Generally speaking, judicial corruption seems to exist in all main Chinese court divisions where key 
functional judicial power exists.
206
 While the more visible issues with judicial corruption and 
competence has been identified to exist in the basic level courts, the judges in the more developed 
eastern region and larger cities are perceived to be more qualified than the ones in the western or 
middle region and in small towns.
207
As China’s economic reform has progressed, the significance 
of single companies for local governments has decreased. In correspondence, the incentive of local 
governments to engage in corrupt practices, such as local protectionism, has also arguably 
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decreased. On the other hand, the enforcement of arbitral awards is likely to remain more difficult 
in poorer and less judicially competent jurisdictions.
208
  
The available data on the enforcement of arbitral awards has been mostly courtesy of PRC sources, 
which have arguably provided a more favourable (and incomplete) perception regarding the 
enforcement of arbitral awards in China in comparison to the data gathered by foreign legal 
scholars.
209
 This being said, the more recent studies indicate that in urban areas the enforcement of 
arbitral awards has significantly improved, and that non-enforcement of arbitral awards in China is 
rather related to the insolvency or encumbrance of the defendants’ assets instead of, for example, 
local protectionism.
210
 In addition, the SPC has taken measures in order to curb inappropriate 
review of arbitral awards, such as the pre-reporting system, which makes it mandatory for lower 
level courts to obtain the approval of upper level courts, and ultimately the SPC, for any decision 
that would lead into the non-enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. As a result of the promising 
development, the lack of the Chinese judges’ experience in handling arbitration cases has been 
argued to pose the largest contemporary threat for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
instead of corruption.
211
 
To conclude, it seems that the days of arbitrary rule are now a matter of the past in China.
212
 
Whether the CCP is genuinely serious about addressing the rest of the issues related to the 
institutional framework of China’s legal system remains, however, unanswered to date.213 
Notwithstanding the Chinese rhetorics on its struggle against corruption and the promotion of rule 
of law, the CCP’s anticorruption and rule of law policies have arguably not yet risen to the top of its 
agenda.
214
 Despite its shortcomings, China’s legal system has been perceived to play a significant 
role in Chinese dispute resolution, although its quantitative significance cannot be judged in 
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comparative terms because of the lack of systematic data.
215
 Because an increased amount of 
Chinese government officials, policy makers, judges, academics, and non-governmental 
organisations perceive the existence of a reliable legal system and a more independent judiciary as a 
positive factor, the CCP seems now to be committed to the realisation of a thin variant of a rule of 
law out of necessity, if not anything else.
216
 
3.2.2 Can CIETAC Arbitration Be Trusted? 
Before going into the details of CIETAC arbitration, a disclaimer is in order. Premised upon the 
longstanding Chinese tradition of a society governed by li, Chinese parties are perceived to prefer 
informal means of dispute resolution through negotiation or mediation instead of litigation. Owing 
to the tradition of harmonious settlement of disputes, Chinese arbitration commissions even today 
tend to feature a possibility for ‘harmonious arbitration’, which is a mixture of mediation and 
arbitration
217
. Albeit Chinese parties prefer arbitration in comparison to litigation in general, it has 
been suggested that foreign parties should consider any formal means of dispute resolution as a last 
resort in order to avoid to damaging their commercial relationships with their Chinese partners.
218
 
Nonetheless, growing international trade with China has resulted in the CIETAC to emerge as the 
busiest arbitral institution in the world since 1993, handling currently about 1300 cases per year on 
average.
219
 Contrary to the ICC, the CIETAC has never enjoyed the prestige to contribute to the 
development of international arbitration. Instead, the CIETAC has had to focus its resources in 
order to convince (foreign) parties that it can offer a viable alternative compared to the other more 
reputed arbitral institutions.
220
 Despite the numerous figure of handled cases and the Chinese efforts 
to internationalise and liberalise its organs and rules, foreign corporations, counsels and scholars 
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tend to have a critical perception about arbitration conducted in the CIETAC.
221
 Should foreign 
parties and their counsels perceive CIETAC arbitration as an attractive method of Sino-foreign 
dispute resolution, the CIETAC must be able to provide vis-á-vis their Chinese partners an effective 
and fair mechanism of dispute resolution. In any event, it would seem that the CIETAC currently 
has, at least amongst Western parties, an image problem.
222
 
Generally speaking, Chinese parties tend to prefer Chinese arbitration in comparison to, for 
instance, ICC arbitration because of the perceived higher costs of overseas arbitration and language 
barriers.
223
 Additionally, the concern regarding the fairness and impartiality of arbitration has been 
noted to be shared by Chinese businesses regarding overseas arbitration.
224
 In particular, China’s 
state-owned enterprises have been identified to possess a tendency to conduct their agreements with 
their foreign partners under standard-form contracts, which stipulate that disputes are to be resolved 
by arbitration taking place in China.
225
  
Notwithstanding whether the Chinese concerns are justified or not, the referred conflict of interest 
between foreign and Chinese parties inevitably complicates the choice of the arbitral venue. 
According to Håkansson, Chinese parties seem to be more comfortable to agree to overseas 
arbitration in valuable contracts involving large foreign investments. This being said, the majority 
of Sino-foreign contracts have been noted to provide for CIETAC arbitration.
226
 
Chinese arbitration law sets high moral and professional qualifications for being an arbitrator in 
China. Whereas Chinese judges may be admitted after two years’ of experience in legal work after 
passing the National Judicial Exam, Chinese arbitrators are required to have eight years of legal or 
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judicial experience or a senior professional title in the field of trade and economics.
227
 Foreigners 
are allowed to serve as arbitrators with more relaxed requirements.
228
 However, as the case has been 
with other former socialist countries, Chinese arbitration commissions maintain closed panel lists 
from which the arbitrators are appointed. Most of the panelists are Chinese nationals, and the 
presiding arbitrator has been noted to be Chinese by default.
229
 Chinese scholars have justified such 
restrictions of party autonomy with the immaturity of the Chinese arbitration community.
230
 Albeit 
the amount of panelists has been increased and the appointment criteria gradually loosened, the fact 
that a CIETAC arbitral tribunal may consist of one, if not three Chinese nationals can be an 
unpleasant surprise for the foreign party and be understandably perceived as a partial practice.
231
 
This concern is particularly dire with regard to FIEs
232
, which are deemed to be domestic entities 
under PRC law and may thus lose the opportunity to appoint foreign arbitrators from the CIETAC’s 
international panel.
233
 
But is CIETAC arbitration fair and effective? According to statistical data analysed by a CIETAC 
arbitrator, arbitral awards rendered from CIETAC arbitration have been noted to be de facto 
substantively fair.
234
 On the other hand, even if the CIETAC is rendering substantively fair 
decisions, this in itself does not necessarily mean that the procedures have been conducted in a fair 
manner. There is, however, little empirical evidence to support allegations of anti-foreign bias 
amongst Chinese arbitrators.
235
 Furthermore, whereas local protectionism infamously plagues the 
Chinese judiciary to date, Cao has assessed that the location of the CIETAC commissions in the 
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capital and the other more developed Chinese cities protects the institution from the influence of 
local protectionism.
236
 Indeed, it is true that researchers of Chinese law typically associate local 
protectionism with lower-level Chinese courts rather than high-profile arbitration institutions such 
as the CIETAC.
237
  
Again, a disclaimer is in order. It would be somewhat naive to assume that tendencies equally 
worrisome to local protectionism would be non-existent in CIETAC arbitration. For instance, 
Jerome A. Cohen, a respected legal scholar and experienced CIETAC arbitrator, has urged for the 
CIETAC to address the defects that relate to the procedure according to which the arbitrators’ 
hearing the proceedings are chosen, considered biased, and expected confidentiality.
238
 Indeed, 
some practitioners even claim that CIETAC arbitration should be avoided at all costs.
239
  
Despite room for improvement thus still exists due to the admitted immaturity of the Chinese 
arbitration community, it would seem appropriate to conclude that the CIETAC is doing its best to 
meet the expectations of the international business community.
240
 In the author’s opinion, the most 
urgent issues related to CIETAC-administered arbitrations seem to be rather are related to the 
restrictions set by the Chinese law on arbitration than the CIETAC.
241
 Again, because Chinese 
arbitration law does not explicitly allow separate choice-of-law rules to be applied in proceedings of 
international arbitration, Chinese arbitral tribunals may not determine the applicable choice-of-law 
rules. Instead, the choice-of-law rules of the national law in the territory of which the seat of the 
arbitration is held that become applicable. In conclusion, the Chinese Communist Party has decided, 
contrary to international practice, to retain the power to determine what choice-of-law rules a 
Chinese arbitral tribunal may apply. With regard to the fulfilment of the principle of party 
autonomy, another conclusion would exaggerate the currently non-existent power of the CCOIC 
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and CIETAC with regard to the determination of the choice-of-law rules applied in CIETAC-
administered arbitrations.
242
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single-party authoritarian state. See supra Chapter 3.2.1. 
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4 The Determination of the Substantive Law in the Absence of the Parties’ 
Agreement 
4.1 Under the Arbitration Rules of the ICC 
4.1.1 Determination of the Place of Arbitration 
When a Request for ICC Arbitration based on a validly concluded arbitration clause is filed, one of 
the first steps of the ICC Court of Arbitration (“ICC Court”) is to determine the place of the 
arbitration. This is an important preliminary question requiring clarification inter alia because the 
parties’ choice regarding the substantive law may be limited by the mandatory provisions of the law 
of the seat of arbitration.
243
 In the absence of the parties’ agreement, the place of the arbitration 
shall be fixed by the ICC Court.
244
 The ICC Rules do not provide any explicit guidelines regarding 
the factors that determine or influence the choice of the place of arbitration. Regarding the lex 
arbitri, the choice of the ICC Court should, however, ensure that the parties and their chosen 
arbitrators are able to exercise their discretion regarding the arbitration proceedings within the 
boundaries set by the ICC Rules and inter alia the New York Convention. Experienced 
commentators have listed other contributing factors to include the perceived neutrality of the forum, 
the effectiveness of the ultimate award, the attitude of the local courts, the availability of adequate 
support services, the parties’ choice of the applicable law and the convenience of the parties.245 
Applying these factors, the ICC Court in 2012 selected 92 different cities in 59 countries.
246  
                                                 
 
243
 The number of countries in which an international arbitration could be safely situated used to be considerably 
smaller because of the prevalence of unfavourable local laws on international arbitration. As a result of the worldwide 
trend towards modernisation and liberalisation of arbitration laws, this number has increased significantly. 
Nevertheless, the choice of place of arbitration remains a decision that must be made with care. See Derains – Schwartz 
2005, pp. 210 – 211 and Craig – Park – Paulsson 2000, p. 8 and 185. In the author’s opinion, the CAL, which is 
elaborated in this study, remains to be a fairly good contemporary example of a restrictive lex arbitri. 
244
 See ICC Rules, Art. 18(1). The wording of the provision has been made deliberately in order to stress the created 
link between the arbitration and a specific jurisdiction. Should the parties’ want to agree validly on the place of the 
arbitration, they should explicitly refer to a city as the place of arbitration instead of a country. See Grierson – Van 
Hooft 2012, p. 32 and Derains – Schwartz 2005, pp. 211 – 212. 
245
 See Grierson – Van Hooft 2012, pp. 118 – 119; Derains – Schwartz 2005, pp. 212 – 215 and Craig – Park – Paulsson 
2000, pp. 186 – 189. 
246
 The same statistics reveal that the choice of the place of arbitration was left for the ICC Court only in 10 per cent of 
cases. See ICC Statistics 2012.  
  
43 
 
4.1.2 Terms of Reference 
Once the ICC Court has made the initial decisions regarding the arbitration, the Secretariat of the 
ICC will transfer the details of the arbitration for the arbitral tribunal.
247
 After the chosen arbitrators 
have received this file, one of the first measures taken by them is to draft a document called “Terms 
of Reference”. This document is an agreement between the arbitral tribunal and the parties, which is 
drafted in order to keep track of the details of the arbitration and the parties’ claims concerning the 
dispute at hand.
248
 The content of the Terms of Reference is stipulated upon Article 23(1) of the 
ICC Rules, which, among other things, should include remarks concerning the parties’ agreement as 
to the substantive law governing the dispute or else their contentions as to what that law should 
be.
249
 
In the absence of the parties’ express or tacit agreement regarding the law applicable to the merits 
of the dispute, the chosen arbitral tribunal is to search guidance from the chosen rules of 
arbitration.
250
 The ICC Rules contain explicit provisions regarding the arbitrators’ inquiry to 
determine the substantive law. Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the choice of the arbitral 
tribunal between the various approaches depends on whether the parties have made an explicit 
reference regarding the scope of discretion conferred on the arbitral tribunal. Therefore, the 
following systematisation elaborates the normative content of the ICC choice-of-law rules in 
correspondence with the scope of discretion given for the arbitrators, beginning from the approach 
conferring the broadest scope of choice-of-law power available. 
                                                 
 
247
 See ICC Rules, Art. 16. 
248
 The drawing up of Terms of Reference is one of the principal hallmarks of ICC arbitration: it is performed in all ICC 
arbitrations. In practice, many experienced arbitrators will draw up a similar document at the beginning of the 
proceedings even in ad hoc arbitrations or arbitrations administered by institutions other than the ICC. See Grierson – 
Van Hooft 2012, p. 146. 
249
 Each arbitrator has his or her own preference as to how to draft Terms of Reference, and there are many different 
formats of Terms of Reference that manage perfectly well to incorporate the information stipulated by Article 23(1). 
Ibid, pp. 147 – 149.  
250
 It should be emphasised that the parties are free at any point during the arbitration to agree upon the applicable law. 
In practice, when the dispute has culminated into the point that the parties must seek remedy from arbitration, the 
chances of finding an amicable solution regarding the substantive law might be very slim. A recalcitrant party is rather 
more likely to dispute all of the equivocal facts regarding the underlying contract in an attempt to avoid or delay the 
arbitration proceedings. See Ferrari – Kröll et al. 2010, pp. 21 – 22. 
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4.1.3 The Various Approaches Provided by ICC Rules 
First of all, the arbitral tribunal may under the ICC Rules assume the powers of an amiable 
compositeur, if the parties have explicitly agreed on it.
251
 This is a so-called equity clause, meaning 
that the arbitral tribunal is under the discretion of an amiable compositeur free to determine the 
applicable rules of law on the basis of what is ‘fair and reasonable’ rather than on the basis of 
law.
252
 
If the parties have not explicitly agreed upon conferring such powers to the arbitral tribunal, the 
ICC Rules will serve as the basis of inquiry regarding determination of the governing law. The 
provision regarding the determination of the applicable rules of law states: 
The parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied by the arbitral 
tribunal to the merits of the dispute. In the absence of any such agreement, the arbitral 
tribunal shall apply the rules of law, which it determines to be appropriate.
253
 
While the first part of the provision confirms the parties’ freedom to determine the applicable rules 
of law to the merits of the dispute, the second part of the provision directs the arbitral tribunals’ 
inquiry upon the applicable law in the absence of such an agreement. In relation to the second part 
of the provision, the notions “rules of law” and “determines to be appropriate” call for further 
interpretation. 
According to internationally established arbitration practice, the notion “rules of law”, contrary to 
the notions “the law” or “laws”, may also refer to other sources of law besides national 
legislation.
254
 Whereas contemporary national choice-of-law statutes still tend to embrace the 
approach where only national legislation qualifies as the source of applicable law, modern 
                                                 
 
251
 See ICC Rules, Art. 21(3). The notions amiable compositeur and ex aequo et bono are used interchangeably in both 
arbitration rules and national arbitration statutes. See Wortmann 1998, p. 103 at fn. 32. 
252
 Whereas the notion ‘in equity’ is obviously prone to several different interpretations, commentators do, however, 
agree that even an arbitral tribunal deciding the applicable law ex aequo et bono must act in accordance with some 
generally accepted legal principles. In the view of Redfern – Hunter et al. this means that the arbitral tribunal should 
reach its decision based largely on a consideration of the facts and on the provisions of the contract, whilst trying to 
ensure that these provisions do not operate unfairly to the detriment of one or the other of the parties. See Redfern – 
Hunter 2009, pp. 227 – 228.  
253
 See ICC Rules, Art. 21(1). 
254
 See Derains – Schwartz 2005, pp. 234 – 237. 
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arbitration statutes tend to favour the “rules of law” approach.255 Other sources of applicable law 
referred to could be, for instance, the general principles of law, lex mercatoria or the UNIDROIT 
Principles.
256
 Thus, the ICC Rules allow for the arbitral tribunal to look beyond a national system of 
rules, even when the parties do not expressly direct them to do so.
257
 In addition, the notion “rules 
of law” in the context of ICC arbitration has been interpreted to allow for the use of dépeçage, i.e. 
the parties’ or their chosen arbitrators’ choice of having different laws to govern different aspects of 
a dispute which may arise between them.
258
  
The notion “determines to be appropriate” featured in Article 21(1) of ICC Rules is a manifestation 
of the direct approach.
259
 As in the case of deciding the applicable law ex aequo et bono, the broad 
discretion provided by the direct approach does not, however, imply that the arbitrators may make 
an arbitrary choice.
260
 Ferrari – Kröll et al. have assessed some of the possible choices of law, when 
the arbitrators are vested with the choice-of-law power conferred by the direct approach. These 
include: 
- the substantive law of the seat of the arbitration; 
- the substantive law of an unrelated, “neutral” country; 
                                                 
 
255
 See, for instance, Rome I Art. 3(1), which refers to “the law” chosen by the parties as the source of the governing 
law. The “rules of law”- approach became more common in national arbitration statutes after 1985 when UNCITRAL 
Model Law implemented the approach in its Article 28. Consequently, the countries that later implemented the Model 
Law as their national arbitration law allow the choice of transnational codifications as the substantive law. Arbitration 
scholars have been unanimous concerning the recognition of the implicit reference of the phrase to concern 
transnational rules; national courts have never questioned this interpretation. See Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, 
pp. 801 – 802. 
256
 Transnational sources of law may apply in several different forms in connection with a dispute submitted to 
international commercial arbitration: they could supplement and correct the applicable national law or function as an 
autonomous source of law. The role of lex mercatoria, however, depends on what the applicable choice-of-law rules 
allow for. See Liukkunen 2013, pp. 209 – 210. Whenever the parties refer to transnational sources of law, the arbitral 
tribunal is to establish what the parties had in mind when they used a particular expression to describe the rules of law 
applicable to the dispute. In doing so, they must take into account the continuing linguistic fluctuations and search for 
the true intention of the parties by going beyond the terms actually used. On this matter and the discussion regarding 
which rules may qualify as transnational rules, see Liukkunen 2013, pp. 210 – 217 and Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 
1999, pp. 801 – 806.  
257
 See Ferrari – Kröll et al. 2010, pp. 294 – 295. Statistics, however, indicate that this power is not de facto utilised in a 
comprehensive scale, as only 3 per cent of the ICC arbitrations conducted in 2012 specified another set of norms than a 
state law as the applicable law. See ICC Statistics 2012. 
258
 Though Lew et al. would extend dépeçage only to concern arbitration rules which refer to ‘laws’ in a plural form, a 
commentary and relevant awards explicitly confirm the allowance of dépeçage in ICC arbitration. See Lew et al. 2003, 
pp. 41 and Derains – Schwartz 2005, p. 234.  
259
 See Derains – Schwartz 2005, pp. 239 – 241 and Craig – Park – Paulsson 2000, p. 320. On the direct approach, see 
supra Chapter 2.1. 
260
 In order to fulfil its duty under Article 31(2) of the ICC Rules, the arbitral tribunal is obliged to state the reasons, 
among others, regarding the choice of the substantive law. See Craig – Park – Paulsson 2000, p. 329. 
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- the most “modern”, “commercial” or “developed” law or rules of law; 
- combination of the rules found in the national laws of the countries connected to the dispute 
(the tronc commun doctrine); and 
- the uniform substantive law conventions.261 
Arguably the most intuitive choice would be to apply the law of the seat of the arbitration as the 
substantive
 
law. It has been reasoned that if the parties make no express choice of law but agree to 
the litigation of future disputes in a particular country, the parties’ intention to apply the national 
law of that country could be inferred from this consensus.
262
 Several commentators have, however, 
opined that such reasoning is dubious even when applied to national court proceedings and does fit 
even worse in the context of contemporary international arbitration.
263
 Thus, the choice of the place 
of the arbitration should count as nothing more than another general connecting factor, which may 
be of relevance in the circumstances of the particular case.
264
 
The arbitrators may also choose to apply a law that may prima facie appear to be completely 
unfounded for.
265
 The grounds for the choice of an unrelated or neutral law may, however, be 
shrouded by the fact that the arbitrators’ analysis involves the balancing of several connecting 
factors, which combined suggest the application of a neutral law.
266
 
The selection of the law that the arbitrators believe to be the most “modern”, “commercial” or 
“developed” has been argued to reflect the truly independent nature of the voie directe from any 
                                                 
 
261
 See Ferrari – Kröll et al. 2010, pp. 297 – 303. 
262
 In an award made in Paris in 1976 in ICC Case No. 2735, the arbitral tribunal considered that the choice of 
applicable law could be inferred from the determination of the seat of the arbitration. 
263
 See Redfern – Hunter 2009, p. 233. 
264
 See Ferrari – Kröll et al. 2010, p. 297 and Lew et al. 2003, pp. 415 – 416. An award rendered in London in 1988 
stated that “the choice of London as the place of arbitration and English as the language of the contract does not, in 
itself, indicate an intention of the parties that English law should govern the validity of the agreement to arbitrate.” See 
ICC Case No. 5717. The reasoning of the cited award has been praised to reflect the ideals of modern international 
arbitration. See Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, p. 788. 
265
 In an influential ICC Award No. 3540 rendered in 1980, the arbitral tribunal reasoned that “an arbitral clause does 
not allow the choice of a substantive law to follow from the country where the arbitral tribunal has its seat, since that is 
merely an indication which itself is insufficient […]; as is, moreover, a contractual prorogation of competence in favor 
of an ordinary court […], that thus the maxim qui elegit judicem eleget ius has been abandoned”. In other words, the 
arbitral tribunal completely excluded the application of the substantive law of the lex arbitri in its reasoning. 
266
 The connecting factors taken into account could inter alia consist of the connection of the country of the applicable 
law to the parties or the dispute, the place of the business of the parties, the place of performance of the contract or 
where it had been concluded. In any event, such an analysis typically involves a certain kind of conflicts of law 
analysis. See Ferrari – Kröll et al. 2010, pp. 298 – 299. 
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conflicts of law analysis.
267
  However, Ferrari – Kröll et al. note that whereas such an approach 
does implement the ideals of a truly anational procedure of international arbitration, it puts, in 
practice, more constraint on the arbitrators’ expertise.268 
The tronc commun doctrine is another example of a completely independent approach. The basic 
idea of the doctrine is to compare the substantive rules of the various countries connected with the 
dispute and apply them in a parallel manner. In practice, the utilisation of the tronc commun 
doctrine can be difficult, as the application of several, possibly conflicting rules of law not only 
requires extensive studies of comparative law but also may prove to be virtually impossible due to 
the incompatibility of the rules. Consequently, the doctrine has been rarely put to practice.
269
 
Instead, uniform substantive law conventions have proved to be more successful embodiments of 
the international principles utilised in international commercial arbitration. Albeit the application of 
inter alia the 1964 Hague Uniform Sales Law or the CISG in an arbitration procedure would not 
seem to manifest the direct approach very well,
270
 arbitrators have been forced to resort to the 
referred conventions because the requirements for their application were simply met.
271
 On the 
other hand, some ICC arbitral tribunals have also voluntarily invoked to the conventions as the 
source of governing law, premised on the conventions’ embodiment of lex mercatoria and 
international trade usage.
272
 For the sake of clarification, it should, however, be noted that the 
presented list of available choices regarding the governing law is non-comprehensive.
273
 
                                                 
 
267
 The same claim is true regarding the application of transnational law, e.g. the generally accepted principle(s) of 
contract law, UNIDROIT Principles or lex mercatoria. See ICC Arbitral Awards Cases No. 11440, 8547 and 3131 
respectively. 
268
 See Ferrari – Kröll et al. 2010, pp. 300 – 301. 
269
 Ibid, p. 302. 
270
 The application of the uniform substantive law conventions outlines the discretion of the arbitral tribunal to resemble 
the one exercised by a court of a Contracting State. Ibid, p. 303.  
271
 See ICC Interim Award in Case No. 9781; Arbitral Award Case No. 8817; ICC International Court of Arbitration, 
Arbitral Award Case No. 6076. For a case where the CISG was not applied because the applicability requirements were 
not met, see ICC Arbitral Award Case No. 6281. 
272
 See, for instance, ICC Arbitral Award Case No. 2879. 
273
 Other scholars argue that the cumulative application of the different rules of conflict of the countries having a 
relation to the dispute has been the most frequently used method of reasoning in ICC arbitrations. See Craig – Park – 
Paulsson 2000, pp. 326 – 327. In Lando’s opinion, there are as many approaches to determine the substantive law as 
there are nationalities, legal backgrounds and attitudes of the arbitrators. See Lando 1991, pp. 140 – 141. 
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4.2 Under the Arbitration Rules of the CIETAC 
4.2.1 Determination of the Place of Arbitration 
With its headquarters in Beijing, the CIETAC features sub-commissions in Shenzhen, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Chongqing and, as a result of the CIETAC’s latest effort to internationalise, Hong Kong 
SAR.
274
 Late developments have, however, complicated the choice of the arbitral venue in 
CIETAC-administered arbitrations as the CIETAC has been since mid-2012 been in a brawl 
between its sub-commissions in located in Shenzhen and Shanghai. As a result, the Shenzhen and 
Shanghai sub-commissions declared their independence from the CIETAC and inter alia changed 
their names and stipulated arbitration rules of their own.
275
 In consequence, parties have been 
advised to refrain from drafting arbitration clauses that refer to either CIETAC Shanghai or 
Shenzhen as the place of arbitration.
276
  
The choice of the place of arbitration regarding CIETAC arbitration prima facie appears relatively 
simple. The parties may freely agree upon the place of arbitration.
277
 When the parties have not 
agreed on the place of arbitration or their agreement is ambiguous, the place of arbitration shall be 
the domicile of CIETAC or its sub-commission/centre administering the case.
278
 This being said, 
the amendments made to Article 2(6) of the CIETAC Rules lead to the default administration of 
CIETAC Beijing in the absence of the parties’ agreement and, consequently, for the place of the 
arbitration to be in Beijing in the absence of party instructions.
279
 It has been argued that the 
cumulative effect of these revisions was the reason for the discontent and withdrawal of the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen sub-commissions from CIETAC.
280
 Albeit Article 33(4) of the CIETAC 
Rules does allow for hearings also to be held abroad, this provision is insignificant in relation to the 
choice of the place of the arbitration.  
                                                 
 
274
 See the Official Websites of the CIETAC. Last visited 22
nd
 of January 2014. Because of the multi-jurisdictionality of 
the People’s Republic of China, arbitration proceedings between parties from mainland China and Hong Kong SAR, 
Macao SAR and Taiwan are considered to be ‘foreign-related’ instead of domestic ones. See Tao 2012a, p. 98. 
275
 See Leung 2013, p. 2. 
276
 Ibid, pp. 8 – 9. Chinese courts have taken an inconsistent approach with regard to the validity of arbitration 
agreements and the enforceability of awards in connection with the Shenzhen and Shanghai sub-commissions. Even 
though the SPC has acknowledged the potential problems caused by the referred breakaway, it has not issued any 
express clarification. See D’Agostino et al. 2014. 
277
 See Art. 7(1) of the CIETAC Rules. 
278
 See Art. 7(2) of the CIETAC Rules. 
279
 See Choong 2014, p. 2. 
280
 Ibid. 
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The CAL will apply as the lex arbitri when the parties have explicitly chosen it or the seat of the 
arbitration is in mainland China. Most importantly, in the absence of the parties’ agreement, the 
CAL will also apply if a Chinese tribunal has been seized. Thus, the applicability of the CAL may 
be only avoided by either explicitly choosing a different lex arbitri or a place of arbitration outside 
of China provided that the applicable Chinese law entitles the parties to submit their dispute to a 
foreign jurisdiction.
281  
The latter option, the CIETAC’s power to opt for a place of arbitration outside mainland China, is 
an addition made in the latest revision of the CIETAC Rules.
282
 This could represent a significant 
change to earlier practice, given that the choice of the seat of arbitration inter alia determines the 
law governing the arbitration procedure. Because the clause is relatively new, there is no praxis 
regarding the application of the provision. Consequently, the practical significance of the addition 
remains to be seen. On the one hand, it has been assessed that the revised Article 7(2) of the 
CIETAC Rules is explicitly meant to bring about the possibility of a CIETAC arbitration having a 
non-Chinese law govern the arbitral proceedings. By doing so, CIETAC could appear as a more 
flexible and attractive venue for arbitration in the eyes of foreign parties.
283
 This being said, it has 
been advised that the parties should choose the seat on their own rather than to rely on the 
CIETAC’s discretion.284 
While in theory the choice of a foreign procedural law is thus now possible also in CIETAC 
arbitration, it is hard to understand why anyone would like to do so. Such an arrangement would de 
facto subject the parties and the arbitral tribunal to two procedural laws, i.e. that of the foreign lex 
arbitri and the provisions of the law of the seat of arbitration to the extent of mandatory rules of 
law.
285
 Should the parties’ motive for choosing a foreign procedural law be the avoidance of the 
                                                 
 
281
 See Tao 2012a, pp. 108 – 109. The latter reservation is due to the ‘dual-track’ system of Chinese arbitration, which 
prohibits purely domestic (Chinese) parties from conducting arbitration outside the People’s Republic of China. 
Conversely, the dispute must be classified as ‘foreign’ or ‘foreign-related’ in order to opt for these choices. For more, 
see supra Chapter 1.4.1. 
282
 Article 7(2) of the CIETAC Rules stipulates that the “CIETAC may also determine the place of arbitration to be 
another location having regard to the circumstances of the case.” 
283
 See Lu 2012, p. 305.  
284
 See Zesch 2012, p. 302. 
285
 With the exception of the CIETAC venue located in Hong Kong SAR, the mandatory rules of Chinese law become 
necessarily applicable in the sheer majority of CIETAC arbitrations as they are situated in mainland China, and thus 
subject to the Chinese lex arbitri. See Redfern – Hunter 2009, pp. 184 – 185. 
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mandatory rules of Chinese law, avoiding CIETAC arbitration is advisable in order to ensure the 
enforceability of the rendered award.
286
  
4.2.2 Limitations of Party Autonomy 
When foreign-related arbitration and litigation are concerned, the principle of party autonomy is 
accepted as the rule of thumb of Chinese law.  Conversely, Chinese law does not allow for the 
parties to choose the governing law in non-contractual matters nor purely domestic contracts, or 
when application of the law of another country would be contrary to the public interest of the 
People’s Republic of China.287 As a consequence of these restrictions, it would seem appropriate to 
clarify the situations related to foreign-related contractual relationships where the application of 
Chinese law is demanded by the mandatory rule of PRC law before the choice-of-law methodology 
applied in CIETAC arbitration is further elaborated. 
Article 126(2) of the Chinese Contract Law stipulates that the establishment of wholly foreign-
owned enterprises, Sino-foreign equity and cooperative joint ventures, and Sino-foreign contracts 
for the exploitation of mineral resources within the territory of China shall be governed by PRC 
law. Rules and regulations given by the Chinese authorities explicitly confirm that Chinese law is to 
be inter alia applied to the resolution of disputes arising from these types of contracts.
288
 
In other words, if the subject matter of the underlying contract falls into one of the categories 
elaborated by Article 126(2) of the CCL, the parties or their chosen arbitrators should always 
choose Chinese law to govern the underlying contract. Should another law be chosen, the arbitral 
tribunal risks rendering an unenforceable arbitral award. This conclusion is supported by a recent 
Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court, which states that “where the laws of the People’s 
Republic of China do not explicitly specify that the parties may choose the law applicable to a 
                                                 
 
286
 See Tao 2012a for the same conclusion regarding the mandatory nature of the CAL, p. 107. 
287
 See CCL Art. 126(1); GPCL Art. 145(1); LAL Art. 3 and Liang 2012, p. 79.  
288
 Article 12 of SC Rules 2001 states that ”the conclusion, validity, interpretation, and performance of a joint venture 
contract, and the resolution of disputes arising thereunder shall be governed by the laws of the People’s Republic of 
China”; Article 55 of the MOFCOM Rules 1995 states: “the preparation, effectiveness and implementation of a 
cooperative joint venture contract and the resolution of disputes arising thereunder shall be governed by the laws of the 
People’s Republic of China”. 
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foreign-related civil relation but the parties yet decide to do so, the people’s courts will hold such 
choices as invalid”.289 
The Supreme People’s Court later expanded the mandatory application of Chinese law to other FIE-
related contracts as well by a now-abolished judicial Interpretation.
290
 A Chinese court recently 
refused to enforce an award based on the referred interpretation. The case was about the 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award that related to a share purchase agreement of a Chinese-
foreign equity joint venture involving parties from the P.R. China and a foreign country. The parties 
had included a choice-of-law clause in their underlying contract that stipulated the substantive law 
to be another than Chinese law. When the foreign party attempted to enforce the given award in a 
Chinese court, the court refused to do so because the SPC Interpretation 2007 demanded the 
mandatory application of Chinese law.
291
 
As of April 2013, the SPC Interpretation 2007 has been abolished and thus no longer remains a 
binding source of law. As the SPC is likely to issue a new judicial interpretation in near future that 
could plausibly reinstate these rules, the application of the law of the PRC as the substantive law 
regarding all FIE-related contracts is advisable in order to ensure the enforceability of the rendered 
award in Chinese courts.
292
  
4.2.3 The Limited Choice-of-Law Power of CIETAC Arbitrators 
Albeit neither the CIETAC Rules nor Chinese law impose de jure limitations to the choice-of-law 
power of CIETAC arbitrators, CIETAC’s choice-of-law methodology, which, by default, directs the 
arbitrators to apply the rules of private international law of the lex arbitri, ensures that the 
arbitrators’ discretion to choose the substantive law in CIETAC arbitration is de facto limited. 
                                                 
 
289
 See SPC Interpretation 2013, Art. 6. 
290
 Article 8 of the SPC Interpretation 2007 extended the mandatory application of Chinese law to (1) contracts of 
transfer for shares of Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures; (2) Chinese-foreign contractual joint ventures, or wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises; (3) contracts for operation by a foreign natural person, legal person, or other organisation of 
Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures formed within the territory of China; (4) contracts to 
purchase by foreign natural person, legal person, or other organisation the equity rights of the shareholders of non-
foreign investment enterprises within the territory of China; (5) contracts to purchase by foreign natural person, legal  
person, or other organisation the newly issued shares of non-foreign invested limited liability company or company 
limited by shares within the territory of China; and (6) contracts to acquire by a foreign natural person, legal person, or 
other organisation the assets of non-foreign invested enterprises within the territory of China. 
291
 Unfortunately, no published translation of the case particulars seems to be available. The description regarding the 
case particulars is based on a lecture held by SHEN Wei, 11
th
 of September 2013. 
292
 See infra Chapter 4.2.3. 
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The CIETAC Rules have for a long time contained a somewhat ambiguous provision titled “Making 
of the Award”, which guides the arbitral tribunals’ inquiry regarding the sources of law which can 
be used to determine the applicable law; the provision strongly resembles the position taken in the 
Chinese Arbitration Law.
293
 This article states:  
The arbitral tribunal shall independently and impartially make its arbitral award on the 
basis of the facts, in accordance with the law and the terms of the contracts, with 
reference to international practices and in compliance with the principle of fairness 
and reasonableness.
294
 
The CIETAC Rules include no explicit remarks regarding the arbitrators’ possibility to assume the 
powers of amiable compositeur or decide the applicable law ex aequo et bono. While some 
commentators have assessed the provisions’ reference to ‘fairness and reasonableness’ to in theory 
give arbitrators the ability to decide cases according to principles of equity,
295
 in practice this 
discretion may be exercised only in rare occasions. This is because of the motley collection of 
conflict rules provided by PRC law, which exclude virtually all imaginable situations in which the 
arbitrators’ discretion may be exercised.296 In any event, should the parties’ still wish to confer the 
arbitrators’ the power to act as amiable compositeurs in CIETAC arbitration, they should do so 
expressly.
297
  
Another observation regarding the application of transnational law should be made at this point. 
Premised on international arbitration practice, the reference of both Article 47(1) of the CIETAC 
Rules and Article 7(1) of the CAL to the ‘law’ to would prima facie seem only to allow the 
arbitrators to choose the law of a state as the governing law.
298
 Indeed, the commentary on the issue 
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 CAL Art. 7 stipulates that “[a]rbitration shall be made based on true facts and relative laws to give out a fair and 
reasonable settlement for parties concerned.” 
294
 See Article 47(1) of the CIETAC Rules. 
295
 See Redfern – Hunter 2009, p. 228. Because the applicable law and the principles of equity are occasionally 
mutually exclusive, a question arises as to which has priority and is to be applied in determining a dispute. The well-
established position in China is that the law as selected by the parties and recorded in their arbitration agreement will be 
applied without equivocation. When the selected law is silent on a particular point, the arbitral tribunal will apply 
international practice and the principles of equity. See Tao 2012a, pp. 113 – 116. 
296
 In Chi’s view, the lack of circumstances in which the arbitrators may exercise their discretion ex aequo et bono 
results in a de facto prohibition of ‘in equity’ decision-making in Chinese arbitration. See Chi 2011, p. 271. 
297
 As explained supra in Chapter 4.1.3, the requirement of an express choice stems from international arbitration 
practice. 
298
 See supra Chapter 4.1.3. 
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by leading Chinese scholars confirms such a conclusion.
299
 Should the parties opt for the 
application of supranational rules under the Chinese doctrine of private international law, scholars 
recommend incorporating transnational law as part of the underlying contract rather than referring 
to it as the substantive law.
300
 Albeit the limited scope of application of supranational law under the 
Chinese doctrine has been de lege ferenda criticised as unnecessarily restrictive,
301
 the referred 
practice, based on the GPCL, remains to stay.
302
 
A cited CIETAC award illustrates the status of transnational law under the Chinese private 
international law approach. The award was about an international sales contract between a Chinese 
party and a Korean party. The parties did not choose the substantive law and Korea was neither a 
party to the CISG by the time of arbitration.
303
 The claimant requested the tribunal to apply the 
UNIDROIT Principles, but the tribunal rejected this application and decided to apply Chinese 
contract law pursuant to the closest connection doctrine. The tribunal held that although 
UNIDROIT Principles did qualify as “international practices” as meant by Article 47(1) of the 
CIETAC Rules, the UNIDROIT Principles are only to be applied in the absence of relevant rules of 
the applicable domestic law pursuant to Article 142(3) of the GPCL. As Chinese contract law 
contained rules to settle the dispute, no justification to resort to “international practices” existed.304  
The acceptance of dépeçage in China has only little commentary on it. Albeit the LAL does not 
contain any explicit reference to dépeçage, the doctrine has been well accepted in Chinese legal 
texts.
305
 According to Tu’s analysis, it seems that dépeçage could be accepted to a limited extent in 
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 This is not to say that Chinese courts would not have applied supranational rules regardless of what the Chinese 
doctrine allows for. For instance, in cases Fayau v. Wujin International Trade Co. et al..; Shanghai Lansheng Corp. v. 
Shanghai Branch of OCBC Bank and Citibank China; APL Ltd v. Feida Electrical Apparatus Co. et al, and Xiamen 
Trade Co. v. Lian Zhong (Hong Kong) Co., the court allowed the application of supranational law. See Xiao – Long 
2009, pp. 199 – 200.  
300
 Ibid, p. 201. 
301
 Ibid, pp. 202 – 203. 
302
 Article 142(3) of the GPCL states: “International practice may be applied on matters for which neither the law of the 
People’s Republic of China nor any international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People's Republic of China has 
any provisions.”  
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 See infra Chapter 5.2 regarding the Chinese exclusion of the indirect application of the CISG. 
304
 See CIETAC Award 2007 and also Chi 2011, pp. 274 – 275. Interestingly, Asian countries seem to be relatively 
unanimous in connection with the refusal to recognise the UNIDROIT Principles as the substantive law. See Chi 2010, 
p. 8. On the other hand, the incorporation of the UNIDROIT Principles as contract terms seems to be somewhat 
unproblematic. Ibid and supra fn. 300. 
305
 Under the principle of party autonomy, the parties may agree to choose the law applicable to the contract. According 
to Zhang’s reasoning, nothing thus indicates that the parties may not choose different laws to govern different parts of 
the contract. See Zhang 2011, pp. 121 – 122.   
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China as far as the issue of governing law for a contract is concerned.
306
 However, presumably 
because of the de facto arbitrators’ limited discretion regarding the choice of the substantive law 
under the Chinese choice-of-law rules, the question whether the arbitrators may under Chinese law 
choose different laws to govern different aspects of the dispute remains unsettled.
307
 
Before the introduction of the latest revision of the CIETAC Rules of Arbitration, the CIETAC 
Rules lacked explicit provision(s) that would direct the arbitrators’ inquiry regarding the 
determination of the substantive law in the absence of the parties’ agreement. The new Article 47(2) 
at least partially rectifies this defect. It states: 
Where the parties have agreed on the law as it applies to the merits of their dispute, 
the parties’ agreement shall prevail. In the absence of such an agreement or where 
such agreement is in conflict with a mandatory provision of the law, the arbitral 
tribunal shall determine the law as it applies to the merits of the dispute.
308
 
The CIETAC Rules thus now explicitly confirm the parties’ power to choose the substantive law. 
The latter part of the provision, however, simply confirms the existing doctrine, which does not 
provide the arbitrators with any unequivocal guidance regarding the methodology to determine the 
substantive law. Premised upon international arbitration practice, the arbitrators’ are perceived to be 
responsible to determine the law governing the merits of the dispute in the absence of the parties’ 
agreement.
309
 The confirmation of the arbitrators’ obligation to determine the substantive law in the 
absence of the parties’ agreement thus is, in the author’s opinion, rather trivial.  
The arbitrators’ explicit duty to override a parties’ choice-of-law clause, which conflicts mandatory 
provisions of the law, arguably counts for larger importance. Generally speaking, the arbitral 
tribunal is bound to follow the parties’ instructions because their powers are derived from the 
parties’ agreement. Consequently, arbitrators in general are very reluctant to deviate from the 
parties’ choice regarding the application of the substantive law.310 Cordero-Moss has argued that the 
arbitral tribunal could be bound to disregard the parties’ choice with regard to the substantive law 
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 See Tu 2011, pp. 673 – 674. 
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 See Zhang 2011, p.120 and Tu 2011, p. 673. 
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 See CIETAC Rules, Art. 47(2). 
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 See Fouchard – Gaillard – Goldman 1999, p. 865. 
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 See Bermann – Mistelis 2011, p. 1 and Cordero-Moss 2005, p. 2. 
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when it is in contradiction with the public policy (ordre public) of the otherwise applicable law
311
 
or, alternatively, with another contractual regulation made by the parties themselves.
312 
As 
elaborated supra in Chapter 4.2.2, Chinese law imposes a number of limitations on party autonomy. 
Thus, the arbitrators explicit duty under Article 47(2) of the CIETAC Rules to disregard a choice-
of-law clause, which contradicts with the mandatory provisions of law, is seemingly a direct 
reference to the limitations imposed by the lex arbitri.
313
 
In conclusion, the revised Article 47(2) of the CIETAC Rules would not seem modify the pattern of 
reasoning to determine the substantive law applied in CIETAC arbitration, but instead functions as 
a mere codification of the established practice. As the CIETAC Rules do not provide the arbitrators’ 
any methodology to determine the law applicable to the merits of the dispute, the arbitral tribunal 
must turn to the law of the seat of arbitration for supplement.
314
 Again, this approach is consistent 
with the jurisdictional theory of private international law.
315
 
 
As concluded supra in Chapter 4.2.1, 
the lex arbitri applied in CIETAC arbitration has virtually always turned out to be the law of the 
People’s Republic of China.  
Although the Chinese Arbitration Law and Chinese Civil Procedure Law (“CPL”) are the most 
pertinent Chinese laws in the field of foreign-related arbitration, neither of them provides operable 
conflict of laws rules. This vacuum is thus fulfilled by the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of 
China enacted in 1999 (“CCL”), the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of 
China as amended in 2009 (“GPCL”) and the Law on the Applicable Laws in Foreign-Related Civil 
Relations of the People’s Republic of China adopted in 2010 (“LAL”).  These three laws all 
stipulate that in the absence of parties’ choice, “the law that has the closest connection with the 
contract” shall be applied. Additionally, Article 41 of the LAL adds the law of the habitual 
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 The notion of the ‘otherwise applicable law’ is a reference to the law chosen by the parties’ themselves. See 
Bermann – Mistelis 2011, pp. 1. 
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 See Lu 2012, p. 314. 
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residence of the party whose fulfilment of obligations can best reflect the characteristics of this 
contract as a connecting factor.
316 
 
While some ambiguity does exist regarding the precise scope of application of the closest 
connection doctrine, it has established its status as the most prominent conflicts rule of Chinese 
private international law.
317
 Originally, the closest connection rule was adopted as a conflicts rule in 
the field of contracts. Its application was extended to cover the discipline of private international 
law with the introduction of the now-abolished FECL in 1985.
318
 Generally speaking, the closest 
connection doctrine is perceived as a simple and flexible method of choice-of-law methodology, 
which explains its popularity in national choice-of-law statutes worldwide.
319
 Most importantly, the 
CIETAC arbitrators, too, have confirmedly resorted to the closest connection doctrine in their 
reasoning.
320
 
The vagueness and generality of the said laws has left the concrete application of the Chinese 
closest connection doctrine undefined. In China, such a manner of law-making is common.
321
 The 
NPC’s Standing Committee established a system for the “interpretation of laws” in 1981 as an 
attempt to clarify the mandate of the different law-making organs.
322
 Premised on this system, the 
Supreme People’s Court has been given the mandate to issue various types of judicial documents 
that concern the concrete application of the law in the adjudicative work of the courts, typically 
referred to as judicial interpretations.
323
 In practice, the law-making role of the SPC has been 
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 See Chi 2011, p. 272. In international comparison, the (a) habitual residence of the parties, (b) places of businesses 
of the parties and (c) the place of the characteristic performance have been noted to the factors that are taken into 
account in the closest connection test. With regard to disputes submitted to international arbitration, the parties’ choice 
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 See Art. 5(1) of the FECL; para. 4 of part 2 of the SPC 1987 Interpretation on the FECL; Art. 145(2) of GPCL; Art. 
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 See Liang 2012, p. 77; Tu 2011, pp. 678 – 679 and Yu et al. 2009, pp. 424 – 427. 
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 See Saarikivi 2008, p.65. 
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 See CIETAC Award 2004.  
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 See Peerenboom 2002, pp. 251 – 252. 
322
 In fact, the NPC’s Standing Committee, the SPC, the State Council and even the standing committees of local 
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25. One of the peculiarities of the Chinese normative hierarchy is that all of the referred provisions, though they 
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any of these provisions. Instead, this power has been left solely for the issuing authority. In order to determine the 
applicable provision, the courts or arbitrators must by means of interpretation decide which one of the possibly 
conflicting provisions should prevail.  See Chen 2011, pp. 148 – 149. 
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 Regarding private international law, relevant provisions has been incorporated in the SPC Opinions 1988 
(abolished); SPC Interpretation 2007 (abolished), and the SPC Interpretation 2013 (effective).  
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considered larger than first envisioned, as the SPC’s extensively formed interpretations or “official 
opinions” often are more detailed than the laws themselves. Due to the interpretations’ role as ‘gap-
fillers’, the SPC’s judicial interpretations have been determined to be the most important 
supplementary sources of law despite their ambiguous status in China’s normative hierarchy. In 
fact, the proper enforcement of Chinese laws is arguably impossible without them.
324
 
According to renowned Chinese scholars of private international law, the closest connection 
doctrine is not a single rule to be applied at the arbitrators’ discretion. Instead, the closest 
connection method facilitates the arbitrators’ to determine the place of the characteristic 
performance of the contract.
325
 To date, an interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court issued in 
2007 has provided the basis of inquiry for both Chinese courts and arbitrators respectively. This 
judicial interpretation divided foreign-related contracts into 17 general types, and designed 19 
choice-of-law rules to deal with each of these types respectively.
326
 The notion of “characteristic 
obligation” has thus been determined on the basis of fixed conflict rules for different kinds of 
contracts.
327
 Where the disputed case belonged to one of the types of contracts provided for by the 
SPC Interpretation 2007, the court or arbitral tribunal was facilitated to apply the designated 
conflict rule directly; only if the subject matter of case did not belong to one of these categories, the 
court or arbitrators would be able to exercise their discretion in casu.
328
 Finally, the SPC 
Interpretation 2007 also included an ‘escape clause’, the rationale of which was to avoid results 
leading to ‘unreasonable’ choice, allowing for the arbitrators’ to apply the law of the country, which 
obviously has the most significant relationship with the underlying contract.
329
 
When the substantive law had been successfully identified, the judge or arbitrator may still need to 
identify the exact rule(s) of that law to settle the dispute. This is due to the fact that the “applicable 
law” generally refers to the state law system as a whole. At this point, the Chinese choice-of-law 
doctrine allows for the judges and arbitrators to exercise their own discretion. In most cases, the 
                                                 
 
324
 See Tao 2012a, p. 43; Peerenboom et al. 2010, p. 56; Chen 2008, p. 202; Moser et al. 2007,  p. 50 and  Håkansson 
1999, pp. 24 – 25. 
325
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dispute can be settled upon the completion of the Chinese choice-of-law pattern.
330
 Nonetheless, 
Chinese commentators did identify defects from the SPC Interpretation 2007. These were related to 
the difficulties regarding the determination the correct conflict rule in complicated contracts, and 
the extension of the presumptory rules only to the field of contracts and maintenance.
331
 
As discussed supra in Chapter 1.3, recent developments have further complicated the task to make 
proper legal dogmatic research with regard to the normative content of the Chinese conflicts of law 
regime. Soon after the enactment of the LAL, the SPC declared that any earlier interpretations that 
may conflict with the LAL are not to be applied.
332
 As of 8
th
 of April 2013, the SPC Interpretation 
2007 has been abolished, making the SPC Interpretation 2013 on the LAL the sole binding 
supplementary source of law with regard to Chinese rules of private international law.
333
 The said 
development is apparently related to the latest clean-up of the Legislative Affairs Commission of 
the National People’s Congress’ Standing Committee.334  
As Article 41 of the LAL only provides the methodology to determine the substantive law, the 
question remains: how should the Chinese courts or arbitral tribunals determine the applicable 
conflict rule in the prima facie absence of valid presumptory rules? The author has conceived two 
possible scenarios premised on this development. On the one hand, the absence of binding 
presumptory rules could result in the increased choice-of-law power of the arbitrators and thus an 
arbitration procedure that reflects the principle of party autonomy far better than under the earlier 
legal state. On the other hand, the presumptory rules of the SPC Interpretation 2007 could still 
contribute to the arbitrators’ discretion as de facto source of conflict rules.  
No recent Chinese commentaries, relevant judicial practice or published CIETAC arbitral awards 
regarding the application of the LAL premised on the SPC Interpretation 2013 seem to be available 
to date. Consequently, an attempt to find the correct answer to this question is a seemingly 
insurmountable problem. Being a researcher of a legal system of an essentially foreign origin in this 
matter, the conclusions of this study regarding this matter should be approached with caution.  
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Based on the established Chinese reliance to presumptory rules under the closest connection 
doctrine and the SPC’s function as a gap-filler under the Chinese doctrine of law-making, the author 
suggests that the Supreme People’s Court is about to introduce a new judicial interpretation that will 
more or less reinstate the normative content of the now-abolished SPC Interpretation 2007.
335
  Until 
a new judicial interpretation is issued, the author considers it possible that the conflict rules of the 
SPC Interpretation 2007 could continue to contribute the judges’ and arbitrators’ reasoning 
regarding the determination of the substantive law as a de facto source of law, although it no longer 
is a legally binding source of law.
336
 
The said conclusion finds support from judicial practice. Professor HE Qisheng, an expert of 
Chinese private international law and international commercial arbitration, has assessed that “the 
Chinese choice-of-law pattern has not undergone through any dramatic changes after the enactment 
of the SPC Interpretation 2013, especially in regard to the field of international arbitration”.337    
The author finds this statement rather surprising as the exact normative content of the Chinese 
choice-of-rules is seemingly ambiguous. It might, in fact, very well be that the abolishment of the 
previous SPC Interpretation 2007 has changed this situation.  On the other hand, the interpretative 
authority of the Chinese courts has been noted to be “extremely limited”.338 Perhaps the Chinese 
judges’ and, as an analogy, the arbitrators’ forbearance to exercise more discretion with regard to 
the determination of the substantive law under the Chinese choice-of-law rules is, after all, just the 
logical outcome of the limited interpretative power of Chinese legal professionals.
339
 In any event, 
the application of the Chinese choice-of-law rules is, in the author’s opinion, subject to legal 
uncertainty until a new judicial interpretation is issued. 
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 The cited proposal of the Legislative Affairs’ Commission, which advises to “further regulate and regularly 
improve” the formulation of judicial interpretations, arguably supports a such conclusion. Ibid. 
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 Despite its ambiguity as a source of law after the enactment of the LAL in 2010, Chinese scholars have confirmed 
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The question regarding the factors contributing to the arbitrators’ discretion remains so far 
unanswered by Chinese scholars of private international law.
340
 In the case of Chinese courts, Yu et 
al. argue that an increased discretion has led to an unsatisfactory tendency to apply Chinese law 
(homeward trend).
341
  Albeit a higher standard of reasoning could be rightly expected from an 
expert tribunal of arbitrators, it might not be an overstatement to deduce that CIETAC arbitrators 
may, too, have had a tendency to apply Chinese law whenever possible. As explained, the Chinese 
GPCL has been interpreted in a manner that only allows for the supplementary application of 
transnational law, even in proceedings of international arbitration.
342
 Furthermore, as the Chinese 
rules of private international law apply to both Chinese litigation and arbitration and the Chinese 
arbitration regime remains to be admittedly immature,
343
 such an assumption is, in the author’s 
opinion, justifiable. 
4.3 Comparing the Choice-of-Law Methodology Applied in ICC and CIETAC 
Arbitration  
As the proverb knows, a picture is worth a thousand words.
344
 Thus, the researcher has considered it 
appropriate to demonstrate the arbitrators’ reasoning under the ICC and CIETAC choice-of-law 
methodology with images hopefully of illustrative value. The following descriptions function under 
the assumption that the applicable lex arbitri has been determined according to the default scenario, 
i.e. the ICC Rules are exercised under a neutral, non-restrictive lex arbitri, and the CIETAC Rules 
under the Chinese Arbitration Law.  
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The choice-of-law methodology applied in ICC arbitration may be summarised as follows. If the 
parties have agreed upon the substantive law in their underlying agreement, it shall be respected 
unless it violates the mandatory rule of the lex arbitri.
345
 If the parties have explicitly agreed upon 
conferring the arbitral tribunal the discretion to decide the substantive law in equity, the arbitrators 
may do so. In the absence of the parties’ agreement, the arbitrators’ will determine the applicable 
rules of law as they see appropriate.
346
  
                                                 
 
345
 Albeit the vast majority of awards are performed voluntarily, arbitrators would be foolish to disregard the mandatory 
rules, or public policy, of the country of enforcement, if it can be identified in advance. Should the arbitral tribunal 
render an award contrary to the mandatory rules of the country of enforcement, they risk rendering a practically 
unenforceable award. See Redfern – Hunter 2009, p. 622, Ferrari – Kröll et al. 2010, p. 334 and Bermann – Mistelis 
2011, pp. 12 and 77. 
346
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The methodology to determine the law applicable to the merits of the dispute in CIETAC arbitration 
represents the other extreme regarding the arbitrators’ discretion, and may be summarised as 
follows: If the parties have agreed upon the substantive law in their underlying agreement, it shall 
be respected unless it violates the mandatory rule of Chinese law.
347
 In the absence of the parties’ 
agreement, the arbitral tribunal must use the choice-of-law rules of the lex arbitri due to the absence 
of such rules in the CIETAC Rules. The Chinese rules of private international law facilitate the 
arbitral tribunal to apply the closest connection doctrine, under which the presumptory conflict rules 
provided by PRC law are applied. Only if the subject matter of the underlying contract does not fit 
in the categories elaborated in the SPC Interpretation 2007 or the applicable system of law pointed 
out by the conflict rule does not provide an unequivocal solution, the arbitral tribunal may exercise 
its own discretion to determine the substantive law.
348
 
Albeit the earlier descriptions regarding the choice-of-law methodology applied in ICC and 
CIETAC arbitration are illustrative, they, however, fail to capture all of the aspects in relation to the 
arbitrators’ discretion. The next chart will compare the available techniques to determine the 
substantive law and the available sources of law in ICC and CIETAC arbitration. This chart 
illustrates well how limited the actual choice-of-law power of CIETAC arbitrators is compared to 
ICC arbitrators. 
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The Available Techniques to Determine the Substantive Law and Available Sources of Law  
Applicable 
Technique 
or Source of 
Law 
Amiables 
compositeurs 
Voie directe Voie 
indirecte 
Dépeçage Choice of 
transnational 
law 
Under ICC 
Rules 
Express consent of 
parties required 
Allowed Allowed Allowed Allowed 
Under 
CIETAC 
Rules & 
PRC Law 
Allowed in the 
absence of a 
Chinese conflict 
rule + express 
consent of parties 
required 
Not allowed Allowed in 
the absence 
of a Chinese 
conflict rule 
Unsettled 
issue 
Allowed as a 
supplement in 
the absence of 
applicable 
Chinese 
conflict rule 
 
The conclusions of the conducted functionalist comparison can be summarised as follows. On the 
one hand, the choice-of-law methodology applied in ICC arbitration allows for the arbitrators’ to 
exercise broad discretion regarding the selection of the substantive law in the absence of the parties’ 
instructions. On the other hand, although the CIETAC Rules do not de jure restrict the use of 
‘modern’ choice-of-law methodology, the default application of the presumptory conflict rules 
featured by PRC law in CIETAC arbitration results in a narrow discretion of the arbitral tribunal to 
independently select the substantive law and thus a de facto prohibition of arbitrators’ choice-of-law 
power. Consequently, the application of the Chinese choice-of-law methodology has been rightly 
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assessed to be an illustration of “the lowest level of the arbitrators’ choice-of-law power in modern 
international arbitration”.349 
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 See Chi 2011, pp. 279 – 281. Chi has also compared the application of the UNIDROIT Principles between ICC and 
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5 The Choice Between ICC and CIETAC Arbitration – a Perspective of Private 
International Law 
5.1 Significance of the Substantive Law 
Before the choice between ICC and CIETAC arbitration in Sino-foreign dispute resolution is further 
analysed, one valid question should be answered: Does the choice of the substantive law really 
matter? After all, it has been argued that as the rules of contemporary business law around the world 
have been harmonised, the significance of the choice of the substantive law in relation to the 
outcome of the dispute has correspondingly decreased.
350
  
While this observation might be true to a certain extent, such a thesis does not acknowledge that 
such cases in which there still are substantial differences in respect to competing laws continue to 
exist. The said discrepancies could dictate the outcome of the dispute and thus make the choice of 
the governing law of utmost importance to the parties. For instance, different legal systems may 
feature distinct solutions in relation to transfer of title or risk, rate of legal interest or procedural 
time limits.
351
   
Most importantly, the international business community seems to perceive the choice of the 
substantive law to be the most important factor compared to the choice of the seat, applicable 
arbitration rules and arbitral institution. Whenever international business agreements are drafted, 
this apparently is the natural inclination: the choice of the governing law comes first and is decided 
by the corporate lawyers of the parties before the negotiation of the dispute resolution agreement 
even begins. This in turn is strongly influenced by the type of the contract and the counterparty. In 
other words, the parties choose the substantive law first, as this will apply throughout the 
contractual relationship, and the seat or the institution/rules second, as this choice will only matter if 
a dispute arises at a later stage.
352
 
The answers of the cited questionnaire would seem to be consistent with the analysis made by 
practitioners familiar with issues related to private international law. For instance, Graffi has aptly 
noted that the possibility of disputes arising from contractual relationships is not always given much 
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thought during contract negotiations. Arbitration agreements may sometimes be drafted by 
corporate lawyers or businesspersons who possess little or no practical experience regarding 
international arbitration.
353
 In order to avoid uncertainty regarding the choice of forum, parties 
involved in international contracts have grown a tendency to resort to incorporating model clauses 
recommended by leading international arbitration institutes as part of their underlying contract.  
Another reason for the absence of a choice-of-law clause may also be that the parties’ have simply 
been unable to reach an agreement regarding the substantive law. Sometimes the parties, after a 
long period of negotiation, are simply not able to agree upon the content of choice-of-law clause. 
Instead of starting to negotiate again, the parties might prefer to leave the issue open, or to postpone 
the problem to the time that a dispute arises rather than not to conclude the contract.
354
 As the 
determination of the substantive law is, however, generally regarded as a very complex task, parties 
have been recommended to specify the applicable law as clearly as possible.
355
  
Regardless of the grounds for the absence of a valid choice-of-law clause, a substantial number of 
agreements that are submitted to ICC arbitration have not had a valid choice-of-law clause. 
Statistics indicate that in 12 per cent of ICC arbitrations conducted in 2012, the parties had not 
validly agreed upon the applicable law.
356
  
No such statistical data seems to be available regarding CIETAC arbitration. However, it would 
seem appropriate to assess that this figure could be even higher in CIETAC arbitrations because the 
Chinese mentality of doing business tends to advocate the speedy execution of transactions at the 
cost of proper due diligence.
357
 On the other hand, foreign companies could also contribute to the 
absence of a valid choice-of-law clause premised on their own ‘Orientalist’ prejudices.358 
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5.2 The Choice Between ICC and CIETAC Arbitration 
The appropriate method to judge the success (or failure) of the ICC and CIETAC choice-of-law 
methodology would seem to be to inquire whether the methodology to choose the substantive law 
enjoys the support of the various interest groups related to international arbitration. Generally 
speaking, arbitration scholars tend to prefer choice-of-law methodology that allows the parties and 
their chosen arbitral tribunal to exercise a seemingly unlimited amount of discretion. The choice-of-
law methodology embodied in the ICC Rules is a fine example of this approach.
359
 Under the ICC 
Rules, the arbitral tribunal is provided with a wide scope of discretion although they are powerfully 
simple, thus enabling the arbitrators’ the chance to focus on the selection of the most suitable rules 
of law to the merits of the dispute.
360
 This is not to say that the ICC Rules would be perfect as they 
are. Instead, the perceived advantage of the ICC Rules is their relative simplicity and flexibility. In 
practice, even the most sophisticated arbitration rules will often need to be supplemented by more 
detailed provisions imposed by either the parties or the arbitral tribunal, e.g. the IBA Rules.
361
 
The international business community has certainly approved the ICC’s approach. Today, the 
arbitration services offered by International Chamber of Commerce are arguably perceived to be the 
world’s most prestigious. According to a recent survey conducted by the School of International 
Arbitration, the ICC boasts the most distinguished private dispute resolution mechanism in the 
world: one half of the respondents to the survey chose the ICC as their preferred arbitration 
institution.
362
 
On the other hand, CIETAC arbitrators themselves have claimed that the choice-of-law 
methodology applied in CIETAC arbitration currently complies with contemporary international 
arbitration practice.
363
 Although the majority of (Western) arbitration scholars have abandoned the 
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point of view represented by Lu, it is fair to admit that the use of presumptory rules does undeniably 
guarantee a degree of legal certainty and predictability.
364
 Chi has, however, assessed that the 
application of the Chinese choice-of-law rules in CIETAC arbitration fits rather poorly in the 
context of contemporary international commercial arbitration. In his view, the use of Chinese rules 
of private international law in international arbitration proceedings complicates the applicable law 
identification process in an unduly manner, which endangers the efficiency and flexibility of the 
arbitration. Secondly, it confines the arbitrators’ discretion to truly choose the substantive law to a 
few exceptional situations, which puts the arbitral tribunal in an inferior position in comparison to 
their international counterparts. Thirdly, as the process is established by CCL, GPCL, LAL and the 
SPC judicial interpretations, it is not tailored for arbitration but applies to both arbitrators and the 
judges. By blurring the difference between arbitration and litigation, the private nature of arbitration 
is not sufficiently respected.
365
  
Indeed, in terms of the arbitrators’ discretion to select the substantive law in the absence of party 
instructions, the comparison conducted supra in Chapter 4.3 indicates that proceedings which take 
place under the ICC Rules offer the arbitral tribunal far more discretion in comparison to the 
choice-of-law approach applied in CIETAC arbitration. In other words, the principle of party 
autonomy is given far more emphasis in ICC arbitration in comparison to CIETAC arbitration. 
From the perspective of party autonomy, ICC arbitration thus appears as a preferable option in 
comparison to CIETAC arbitration.
366
 Although such a statement can be considered a rule of thumb 
when deciding whether to opt for either of these arbitral institutions, such situations do exist when 
the amount of the arbitrators’ discretion to identify the substantive law would appear as practically 
insignificant with regard to the choice between ICC and CIETAC arbitration. These exceptions can 
be identified in advance to extend to at least two situations, i.e. whenever: 
1) the subject matter of the contract falls into the scope of application of a uniform law 
convention, such as the CISG; and 
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2) the arbitrators’ choice-of-law power is subject to the limitations set by the mandatory rule of 
Chinese law. 
To begin with, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(“CISG”) is to be directly applied in sales contracts entered by parties whose places of business are 
located in different Contracting States.
367
 According to UNCITRAL, a total of 80 countries have 
joined the CISG to date, including the People’s Republic of China.368  
Extensive judicial practice exists regarding the direct application of the CISG in China. In a dispute 
between a Chinese buyer and an American seller, the Supreme People’s Court held that absent a 
valid choice-of-law clause, the CISG was applied under Article 1(1)(a) because the parties were 
incorporated in China and the United States, respectively, both of which are Contracting States.
369
 
Based on the cited judgment, it has been argued that the Chinese interpretation focuses on the place 
of incorporation rather than the place of business as prescribed in Article 1(1)(a).
370
 Similar 
reasoning has been confirmedly resorted to in several published CIETAC arbitral awards and 
judicial practice.
371
 
The PRC has made two reservations concerning the application of the CISG, the first of them being 
the reciprocity reservation pursuant to Article 95 of the CISG.
372
 The reciprocity reservation 
excludes the ‘indirect application’ of the CISG, i.e. situations in which both of the home 
jurisdictions of the parties in an international sales contract have not signed the CISG. In other 
words, the Chinese reservation restricts the role of private international law in Sino-foreign 
contracts.
373
 The second Chinese reservation concerns the exclusion of Article 11 of the CISG, 
                                                 
 
367
 See CISG Art. 1(1)(a). It is, however, today a common practice in cross-border contracts that the parties decide to, 
either expressly or implicitly, exclude the application of the CISG. See, for instance, Johnson 2011. 
368
 See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html. Last visited 9
th
 of January 
2014. 
369
 See Lianhe Enterprise (US) Ltd. v. Yantai Branch of Shandong Foreign Trade Co. 
370
 See Xiao – Long 2008, p. 65. 
371
 See CIETAC Award 1996; CIETAC Award 2002 and Minermet S.p.A Milan v. China Metallurgical Import & 
Export Dalian Co. and China Shipping Development Co., Ltd Tramp Co. 
372
 The Chinese declaration reads as follows: “The People’s Republic of China does not consider itself to be bound by 
subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 of Article 1.” See UN Treaty Collection. Available at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=X-10&chapter=10&lang=en#EndDec. Last 
visited 30
th
 of March 2014. 
373
 See Xiao – Long 2008, p. 66 and Wang – Andersen 2004, p. 145. 
  
71 
 
which requires contracts “to be concluded in or evidenced by writing”. The effect of this reservation 
is still a matter of dispute, and thus cannot be thoroughly discussed in this study.
374
 
The mandatory application of Chinese law is of the utmost importance in the case of foreign-
invested enterprises. Contemporary China is the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in the 
world.
375
 Prior to investing in China, foreign investors are recommended obtain a thorough 
knowledge of relevant Chinese commercial, investment, environmental, trade and contract law, and 
other applicable laws.
376
 As concluded supra in Chapter 4.2.2, the arbitral tribunal should choose to 
resolve all FIE-related matters on the basis of Chinese law in order to ensure the enforceability of 
the rendered arbitral award in the People’s Republic of China. Consequently, such a conclusion 
effectively excludes the parties’ or their chosen arbitrators’ discretion to apply an otherwise 
applicable law as the substantive law in FIE-related matters. 
Although the principle of party autonomy is an important factor regarding the choice of the arbitral 
institution, it is not the only one. In the case of Sino-foreign dispute resolution, it would appear that 
the weight put on ‘extralegal’ factors, such as the prejudices of both sides regarding both ICC and 
CIETAC arbitration, are seemingly of extraordinary significance.
377
 In the end, the choice of the 
arbitral venue may prove to be a matter of bargaining chips. For instance, the choice of an arbitral 
venue could have been sacrificed in order to be able to decide the substantive law or for a lower 
bulk price.
378
 In Zesch’s view, CIETAC is often chosen as a compromise result after the underlying 
contract negotiations. On the one hand, foreign parties want to avoid litigation in Chinese courts. 
On the other hand, their Chinese business partners are uncomfortable with litigation outside 
China.
379
 Thus, the CIETAC seems to be the closest venue to even ground. 
But why not remedy this by choosing mainland China as the seat for ICC arbitrations? In practice, 
Sino-foreign arbitration proceedings administered by the ICC are usually seated in Hong Kong, 
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Singapore and other Asian countries, and rarely in mainland China.
380
 The principal reason for this 
is the requirement set by the CAL, which requires an arbitration institution to register within PRC 
judicial and administrative departments.
381
 The ICC and other foreign arbitration institutions, 
however, are not registered as arbitral institutions in mainland China, and thus do not meet this 
requirement. In consequence, foreign-related arbitration proceedings seated in mainland China are 
usually administered by Chinese arbitration institutions, such as the CIETAC or the BAC. 
This being said, some parties have agreed to arbitrate under the auspices of the ICC for arbitrations 
seated in mainland China. There has been an ongoing debate among arbitration practitioners as to 
whether ICC awards rendered in mainland China should be recognised as valid, and whether they 
can be enforced in mainland China. The Ningbo Intermediate People’s Court has recognised an ICC 
arbitration award issued by a sole arbitrator in Beijing in 2009, but in doing so treated the award as 
‘non-domestic’ – despite the fact that the arbitration was seated in mainland China – and based its 
decision to recognise the award on the New York Convention rather than on the PRC Civil 
Procedure Law.
382
 
The cited court decision seems to represent an exception rather than the prevailing rule. Despite a 
willingness to support ICC arbitration seated in China seems to exist, the reasoning of the Ningbo 
Intermediate People’s Court in reaching its conclusion has been widely questioned.383 To date, there 
have been no judicial interpretations or legislative clarifications from the higher level courts to 
further clarify this issue. Absent such express clarification, most practitioners continue to 
recommend against the use of arbitration clauses providing for arbitrations with a mainland China 
seat that are administered by the ICC. In conclusion, although Chinese courts have taken steps in 
the direction, which would allow for ICC-administered arbitration in mainland China, Hess has 
considered it unlikely that the Chinese authorities will recognise the ability of foreign institutions to 
administer arbitrations seated in mainland China.
384
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5.3 Is There a Remedy to Enhance the Arbitrators’ Choice-of-Law Power in CIETAC 
Arbitration?  
The arbitrators’ low discretion to make choice-of-law decisions under the CIETAC Rules could be 
attempted to be improved by applying, for instance, the ICC Rules in a CIETAC-administered 
arbitration. Again, Chinese law does not set a de jure ban on the arbitrators’ discretion to choose the 
substantive law.
385
 In consequence, voie directe could be validly applied in CIETAC arbitration as 
the parties would have explicitly agreed upon it in their arbitration agreement. This could, for 
example, be materialised by agreeing to apply the ICC Rules in CIETAC arbitration. Such an 
agreement would confer the CIETAC arbitrators’ the same discretion as their international 
counterparts.   
The parties’ possibility to agree upon the application of the arbitration rules of another institution or 
the UNCITRAL arbitration rules has been explicitly confirmed in the CIETAC Rules, which state 
the following: 
[w]here the parties agree to refer their dispute to CIETAC for arbitration but have 
agreed on a modification of these Rules or have agreed on the application of other 
arbitration rules, the parties’ agreement shall prevail unless such agreement is 
inoperative or in conflict with a mandatory provision of the law as it applies to the 
arbitration proceedings. Where the parties have agreed on the application of other 
arbitration rules, CIETAC shall perform the relevant administrative duties.
386
 
CIETAC arbitrators have noted the application of ICC or UNCITRAL Rules, to the extent as far as 
possible, to be, in fact, a fairly common practice.
387
 In Lu’s view, the relevant issue rather is 
whether the CIETAC is capable of providing the required service under other arbitration rules.
388
 
Because of the general Chinese reluctance to ad hoc arbitration, the application of the rules of an 
arbitration institution, such of the ICC, in CIETAC arbitration would seem like the more viable 
alternative.
389
 Nevertheless, the direct application of the arbitration rules of other arbitration 
institutes is not advisable as it could conflict with the referred arbitration rules and expose the 
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rendered award to challenges.
390
 Should the parties acknowledging the advantages still wish for the 
application of separate choice-of-law rules instead of a choice-of-law clause, the most amicable 
solution would, perhaps, be to simply agree upon the application of the voie directe in the parties’ 
underlying agreement. 
These observations would, however, appear to have only theoretical value. Should the parties be 
aware of the relative ambiguities and complexities related to the determination of the substantive 
law under the choice-of-law rules applied in CIETAC arbitration already during contract 
negotiations, it would make more sense to rather include a choice-of-law clause in the underlying 
contract instead of agreeing on the application of more ‘modern’ choice-of-law rules.391 In 
consequence, the only appropriate remedy for enhance the discretion of CIETAC arbitrators 
regarding the determination of the substantive law would be to amend the CAL so that Chinese 
arbitral tribunals would, too, be mandated to apply the choice-of-law rules they deem applicable or 
appropriate. As noted supra in Chapter 2.1, this could be realised by adding a provision similar to, 
for instance, Article 28 of the Model Law in the CAL.
392
  
5.4 Largest Risks 
Premised upon the large amount of scholarly writing on the issue, the largest risk presented by 
relevant issues of private international law arguably is the admission of an arbitral award that does 
not respect the mandatory rules of Chinese law.
393
As discussed supra in Chapter 4.2.2, Chinese law 
establishes number of limits to party autonomy inter alia when the subject matter of the contract is 
related to foreign-invested enterprises. In such matters, the parties (or, in the last resort, the arbitral 
tribunal) should ensure that the law applied to the merits of the dispute is Chinese law. If the 
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mandatory rules of Chinese law are not respected, the arbitral tribunal risks rendering an award that 
is de facto unenforceable in Chinese courts.
394
 
With regard to choice-of-law issues, the exact scope of application of the mandatory rule of Chinese 
law is currently ambiguous because of the abolishment of the SPC Interpretation 2007. However, it 
is advisable to abstain from the choice of an otherwise applicable law in all FIE-related matters. 
This conclusion is due to the SPC’s likeliness to issue a new judicial interpretation, which could 
formally reinstate mandatory limits of party autonomy formerly featured in Article 8 of the SPC 
Interpretation 2007.
395
 
Notwithstanding the compulsory application of Chinese law to FIE-related contracts, contracting 
parties are permitted to submit for overseas arbitration in foreign-related contractual disputes. 
However, the mandatory application of Chinese law in such contracts makes the discussion 
regarding the pros and cons of a choice-of-law methodology practically insignificant in agreements 
featuring a FIE as a party. In fact, it may be argued that CIETAC arbitration is in FIE-related 
matters a particularly favourable option in comparison to ICC arbitration. Firstly, it is likely that 
CIETAC arbitrators, accustomed to the mandatory requirements set by Chinese laws and 
regulations, are more capable than ICC arbitrators of taking the ambiguities of Chinese law – 
whether justified or not – into account whenever procedural decisions need to be made.396 Secondly, 
a CIETAC arbitral tribunal has arguably better chances of ordering interim measures on the Chinese 
party than a foreign arbitral tribunal based on the newly revised Article 21 of the CIETAC Rules.
397
 
Thirdly, whenever negotiations for the establishment of a foreign-invested enterprise are conducted, 
foreign investors have been noted to experience tremendous difficulties in convincing the Chinese 
side to accept overseas arbitration.
398
 Based on these observations, it is unsurprising to note that 
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disputes related to foreign direct investment into China have comprised a major part of all the 
foreign-related disputes submitted into CIETAC arbitration in the past.
399
 
Another relevant threat for the efficient enforceability of the rendered arbitral award is posed by the 
possible classification of a CIETAC-administered arbitration as domestic one. Albeit a dispute 
featuring a Chinese party and a foreign party is unlikely to be classified as domestic,
400
 the situation 
becomes different when the dispute features a foreign-invested enterprise and a Chinese party as the 
claimant and the respondent. FIEs are, under Chinese law, considered Chinese legal entities without 
exception.
401
 Consequently, the dispute is likely to be classified as domestic and thus may be 
subjected to a broader review in the enforcement stage under the auspices of Chinese law.
402
 
Moreover, the closed-panel system of appointing arbitrators featured in CIETAC arbitration only 
allows for the appointment of foreign arbitrators in foreign-related arbitration proceedings. 
Conversely, this means that only Chinese nationals may be appointed as arbitrators in disputes 
featuring a FIE.
403
 Needless to say, the said situation is likely to be unsatisfactory from the foreign 
investors’ perspective.  
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6 Conclusions 
The differences in the choice-of-law methodology applied in ICC and CIETAC arbitration are 
seemingly rooted in the paradigm struggle between the jurisdictional and delocalisational theory of 
international arbitration. Although most arbitration scholars, practitioners and the international 
business community today emphasise the delocalised and autonomous nature of international 
arbitration, it does not mean that the lex arbitri would not exist. Indeed, the boundaries according to 
which the parties and their chosen arbitral tribunal may exercise their autonomy continue to be, in 
the end, determined by national law. Although national arbitration laws have been extensively 
harmonised, the jurisdictions of individual states, such as the People’s Republic of China, may still 
feature, at least from the perspective of a Western jurist, a peculiar arbitration regime. 
The dichotomy of legal frameworks under which ICC- and CIETAC-administered arbitrations 
currently operate thus explain the discrepancies of their choice-of-law methodologies. Chinese 
Arbitration Law, among other issues, does not allow CIETAC-administered arbitral tribunals to 
exercise any discretion regarding the choice of the applicable choice-of-law rules. Therefore, it is 
the CAL that ultimately forces the arbitral tribunal to apply the conflict rules of the law of the PRC.  
Such a choice-of-law methodology, i.e. the traditional approach, does not, however, adequately 
meet the needs of contemporary international commercial arbitration. The conducted functionalist 
comparison indicates that while the choice-of-law methodology applied in ICC arbitrations allows 
for an arbitral tribunal to exercise broad discretion regarding the selection of the substantive law, 
the default application of the presumptory conflict rules featured by PRC law in CIETAC 
arbitration results in a narrow discretion of the arbitral tribunal to independently select the 
substantive law and thus a de facto prohibition of arbitrators’ choice-of-law power. Subsequently, 
CIETAC arbitrators operate in an inferior position when compared to, for instance, ICC arbitrators. 
Alongside this and other, perhaps even more urgent, issues, the credibility of the CIETAC to 
provide a rational alternative compared to, for instance, ICC arbitration is currently undermined. 
Although contemporary business law around the world has now been harmonised, it does not mean 
that the choice of the substantive law would not be a matter of importance. In fact, the parties and/or 
their counsels still typically decide the substantive law before the choice of the arbitral venue and/or 
applicable arbitration rules. This is not to say that all agreements contain a valid choice-of-law 
clause regardless of recommendations to the contrary.  In terms of the arbitrators’ discretion to 
select the substantive law in the absence of party instructions, ICC arbitration offers the arbitral 
tribunal far more discretion in comparison to the choice-of-law rules applied in CIETAC arbitration. 
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In other words, the principle of party autonomy is given far more emphasis in ICC arbitration in 
comparison to CIETAC arbitration. In terms of party autonomy, ICC arbitration thus appears to be 
the preferable option in comparison to CIETAC arbitration. This being said, extralegal factors, such 
as the prejudices of the parties and balance of bargaining power between them, seem to be of 
extraordinary significance whenever arbitration clauses are drafted between Sino-foreign parties. 
Despite its shortcomings, CIETAC-administered arbitration seems to be an attractive option in 
small-interest disputes, in which either the subject matter of the dispute or the nationality of the 
parties directs the arbitral tribunal to apply the law of the People’s Republic of China as the 
substantive law. In order to ensure the effectiveness of the rendered arbitral award in Chinese 
courts, it is advisable to avoid the choice of an otherwise applicable law when the mandatory rules 
of Chinese law provide otherwise. Alas, the parties possess no effective remedies to enhance the 
arbitrators’ choice-of-law power in CIETAC arbitration. Should they be aware of the complexities 
related to a choice-of-law analysis, it is more sensible to agree upon a choice-of-law clause instead 
of the application of a more ‘modern’ choice-of-law methodology. 
The study has indicated that most of the problems related to arbitration in China rather stem from 
the inadequacy of the CAL to fit the needs of contemporary international arbitration proceedings 
than the CIETAC itself. Therefore, the author strongly recommends, alongside other acquainted 
scholars,
404
 for the CCP to reconsider the reformation of the CAL so that, among others, the choice-
of-law methodology applied in CIETAC arbitrations may be revised. In the light of late 
development, a reform of the Chinese arbitration regime, however, seems unlikely in near future. 
Instead, the CCP and the SPC are both seemingly committed to preserve the status quo, at least with 
regard to arbitration held in mainland China.
405
 This might be due to the relatively large number of 
domestic arbitrations that a revision of Chinese arbitration would affect.
406
 Therefore, it is only 
when the Chinese Communist Party is ready for the full-range judicial reform of Chinese arbitration 
when the choice-of-law methodology applied in CIETAC arbitration can be truly made to match 
international standards. 
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